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CHAPTER 13 
Torts 
PETER A. DONOVAN 
§13.1. Introduction. During the 1971 SuRVEY year, the more no-
table developments in tort law resulted from legislative rather than 
judicial action. The General Court, turning its attention to several dif-
ferent areas of tort law, enacted a number of important statutes: it ex-
tended the no-fault concept to property damage arising from automobile 
accidents, abolished privity of contract as a defense in products liability 
cases, expanded existing remedies under consumer protection statutes, 
increased the maximum amount of permissible damage recoveries 
under the wrongful death statute, limited the charitable immunity 
doctrine, and abolished the host-driver, guest-passenger distinction 
heretofore a part of Ma-ssachusetts law. Of the Supreme Judicial Court 
decisions relating to torts, the more noteworthy cases involved the re-
covery of damages for loss of consortium and for intentionally in-
flicted mental distress, and the Court's first interpretation of the state's 
contribution statute. 
A. LEGISLATION 
§13.2. Motor vehicles: No-fault property damage insurance. By 
enacting Chapter 670 of the Acts of 1970,1 Massachusetts became the 
first state in the nation to adopt a compulsory no-fault insurance plan 
to compensate victims of motor vehicle accidents for losses resulting 
from personal injuries.2 Although a motor vehicle operator is re-
quired to have compulsory liability insurance or to post an equivalent 
bond,3 his only cause of action for damages not in excess of $2000 is 
against his own insurance company; on the other hand, he is not liable 
in tort for damages from personal injuries not in excess of $2000 suffered 
PETER A. DoNOVAN is professor of law at Boston College Law School, director of the 
Environmental Law Center, and editor of the Environmental Affairs Journal. 
§13.2. 1 Chapter 670 is fully discussed in 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law c. 22; recent 
developments are discussed in §§ 11.17 to 11.19 supra. 
2 The elements of damages eligible for compensation are out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses and 75 percent of lost wages or salaries. Pain and suffering may not be an element 
of damages unless the victim's reasonable and necessary medical expenses exceed $500 or 
unless certain specified injuries are sustained. 
'The compulsory liability insurance or bond is to provide the insured against claims 
not falling within' the no-fault coverage limits. 
1
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by other parties who also carry no-fault insurance.4 Chapter 978 of 
the Acts of 19715 has extended the principles of the no-fault personal 
liability plan to property damage as well. The new statute requires all 
motorists to have property protection insurance or an equivalent bond, 
the purpose of which is twofold: first, to provide no-fault protection 
for the motorist's own vehicle and second, to provide liability insur-
ance for reimbursement of damages to the property of others not sub-
ject to the no-fault provisions. The statute completely exempts 
participating motorists from tort liability for damage to vehicles sub-
ject to no-fault protection. By emergency preamble, the statute was 
made effective on January I, 1972. 
Chapter 978 provides three options for the policyholder: all-risk 
coverage, restricted coverage, or no coverage for his own vehicle. 
Under the first and second options, the insurer's liability is limited 
"1-)y the actual cash value of the insured's vehicle, less a $100 deductible 
nless the insured has elected a $50 deductibility option or the policy 
as been written for some other deductible amount). Under the all-risk 
,ption and certain clauses of the restricted coverage option, payments 
must be made to the insured within 15 days after receipt by the insurer 
of reasonable proof that the claimant is a policyholder, that the acci-
dent has occurred, and that the claimed amount of loss or damage has 
actually been suffered. The insured may sue in contract to recover pay-
ments that are delayed longer than 15 days, and "[i]f the court deter-
mines that the insurer was unreasonable in refusing to pay [the] in-
sured's claim, the claimant shall be entitled to recover double the 
amount of damages claimed, plus his costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees fixed by the court. "6 
Both the no-fault and the liability benefits of property protection 
insurance are free of geographical limits; both are available wherever 
an accident may occur, even though the other motorist involved in the 
accident may be an out-of-state driver not covered by the no-fault plan. 
It is important to note that the exemption from tort liability exists, as 
in the case of the personal injury plan, only when the colliding vehi-
cles are covered by no-fault protection. 
§13.3. Products liability: Privity of contract. Probably the most 
startling development in torts during the 1971 SuRVEY year was the 
enactment of Chapter 670 of the Acts of 1971, 1 which abolished the 
privity of contract defense in all products liability cases arising out of 
sales of goods after the effective date of the act (August 18, 1971). The 
history of products liability litigation in Massachusetts is a long and 
4 There are certain instances when the no-fault protection does not apply even though 
the amount of damages may be within the limits of no-fault coverage; see the statute and 
1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §22.9, 22.12. 
5 AmendingG.L., c. 90, by inserting§340. 
6 Acts of 1971, c. 978, §340. 
§13.3. 1 Amending G.L., c. 106, §2-318. Chapter 670 is more fully discussed in ~13.18 
infra. 
2
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tortuous one; it will not be repeated here.2 It is sufficient simply to 
note the inconsistency that the Supreme Judicial Court has steadfastly 
adhered to for the past 25 years since its now famous (or infamous) 
decision in Carter v. Yardley and Co. 3 In Carter, the Court finally ac-
cepted the rationale of Justice Cardozo's landmark opinion in Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co. 4 and held that privity of contract between 
a manufacturer and purchaser was no longer needed for recovery in 
negligence. In the ensuing decades, however, the Court repeatedly held 
that the absence of a privity relationship between the manufacturer 
and purchaser necessitated dismissal of the case whenever the pur-
chaser proceeded upon a breach of warranty theory of recovery. The 
intransigent attitude of the Court in this regard is remarkable in light 
of the almost universal willingness of other jurisdictions to abolish 
privity as a defense in products liability litigation and the increasing 
willingness of judges and scholars to recognize warranty as a tort 
rather than a contract action.5 At long last, the injustice inflicted 
upon Massachusetts citizens6 by the Court's resolution to remain true 
to an outmoded relic has been rectified. 
The full text of the new statute, which is modeled on the Maine 
amendment7 to Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
is as follows: 
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no de-
fense in any action brought against the manufacturer, seller or 
supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, ex-
press or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not 
purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a per-
son whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably 
have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. A manu-
facturer, seller, or supplier may not exclude or limit the operation 
of this section. 
While full discussion of the amended provision is deferred to §13.18 
infra, there are some points that deserve mention here. The use of the 
terms supplier and goods appears to be addressed to important juris-
dictional matters. The first term seems simply to deny to a lessor of 
2 For a summary of the history of the privity of contract doctrine in Massachusetts 
law, see 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§2.1, 2.2; 1969 id. §1.1; 1968 id. §3.3; 1967 id. §3.4. 
3 319 Mass. 92,64 N.E.2d693 (1946). 
'217N.Y.382, Ill N.E.I050(1916). 
5 See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 
Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer) 69 Yale L.J. 1099 ( 1960). See also Donovan, Recent Developments in Products 
Liability Litigation in New England: The Emerging Confrontation Between the Ex-
panding Law of Torts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 Maine L. Rev. 181, 230 
n.219, 230-257 (1967) [hereinafter <:ited as Donovan]. 
6 See 1968Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.3 at 48-49. See also 1969 id. §1.2 at 5-6. 
7 Impetus for the Maine amendment was provided by the Donovan article, n.5 supra, 
and that article should be consulted for assistance in interpreting the Maine and Masssa· 
chusetts amendments to UCC §2-318. 
3
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goods the defense of lack of privity,8 but the impact of the second is 
more difficult to decipher. The term goods is defined in UCC §2-105( I) 
to mean "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which 
are movable at the time of the identification to the contract for sale . 
• • • " 9 Although this definition seems to require an actual sale of 
goods, it is questionable whether the definition is meant to apply to 
products liability warranty actions, since it would appear that the pur-
pose of the amended Section 2-318 is to remove such cases from the 
privity requirement of that code section. Nonetheless, the question 
remains as to whether the amendment abolishes privity as a defense in 
cases involving the sale or supply of "services," as opposed to cases 
involving the sale or supply of "goods." 
In the pre-code cases arising under the Uniform Sales Act, the service 
of food in a restaurant for consumption on the premises, the giving of 
blood transfusions, and the incorporation of construction materials 
in a building did not constitute sales but only the rendition of services. 10 
Decisions under the code have not been consistent where the cost of 
goods is part of the price for services rendered, as is the case with beauty 
parlor treatments. 11 Although the services-goods distinction has 
not been expressly abolished, the scope and tenor of the new amend-
ment would suggest that the General Court intended a complete aboli-
tion of privity in cases where the plaintiff was injured by a product 
put into the channels of commerce, even though the product was used 
incidentally in the rendition of a service. 
Finally, the reference to a person who is "affected" by the goods 
seems to make it clear that the protection afforded by the statute is not 
limited to users and consumers of the goods, but extends to innocent 
bystanders as well. 12 
§13.4. Charitable organizations: Limitation of immunity. Almost 
a century ago, the Supreme Judicial Court decided that charitable or-
ganizations were immune from tort liability for the acts of their agents 
while engaged in charitable pursuits. 1 In so holding, the Court 
adopted the theory espoused by a majority of American jurisdictions 
that charitable funds should not be diverted to purposes other than 
that for which they were donated. With the advent of inexpensive lia-
bility insurance and the action of other jurisdictions in abolishing the 
immunity, the Court recently began to express second thoughts on the 
matter. In Simpson v. Truesdale Hospital Inc., the Court went so far 
8 Cf. Simpson v. Powered Prod. Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 5.55 (C.P. 1963). 
See also Donovan at 233-238. 
9G.L.,c.l06,§2-105(1). 
1o See Donovan at 198. 
11 Compare Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965), with Epstein v. 
Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963). 
12 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965); 
Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963). 
§13.4. 1 McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hasp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876). 
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as to admit displeasure with the rule: "While as an original proposition 
the doctrine might not commend itself to use today, it has been firmly 
imbedded in our law for over three quarters of a century and we think 
that its 'termination should be at legislative, rather than at judicial, 
hands.' " 2 During the succeeding decade, the Court continued to 
await legislative action. 
When, during the 1969 SURVEY year, a case raising the charitable tort 
immunity issue was appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court,3 the 
Court sent a letter to various bar associations, requesting amici curia 
briefs. However, the case was settled prior to the scheduled date for 
arguments, and the issue remained dormant until the end of the year. 
Then, in Colby v. Carney Hospital, the Court decided to overrule the 
doctrine prospectively, saying: 
In the past on many occasions we have declined to renounce the 
defense of charitable immunity . . . because we were of the opin-
ion that any renunciation . . . should be accomplished prospec-
tively ... by legislative action. Now it appears that only three or 
four States still adhere to the doctrine. It seems likely that no 
legislative action in this Commonwealth is probable in the near 
future. Accordingly, we take this occasion to give adequate warning 
that the next time that we are squarely confronted by a legal ques-
tion respecting the charitable immunity doctrine it is our intention 
to abolish it.4 
Although the Court has not had occasion to implement its intention, 
its warning was not unheeded by the General Court. 
Chapter 785 of the Acts of 19715 imposes important limitations on 
the charitable immunity doctrine. The amendment provides that tort 
compensation claimants can now recover up to $20,000 "if the tort 
was committed in the course of any activity carried on to accomplish 
directly the charitable purposes" of the organization. Following exist-
ing law,6 the amendment further provides that charitable organizations 
are subject to unlimited liability "if the tort was committed in the 
course of activities primarily commercial in character even though car-
ried on to obtain revenue to be used for charitable purposes." 
§13.5. Automobile guests: Ordinary care. It has long been the 
law in Massachusetts that the driver of a motor vehicle owes to his 
guest traveling with him only the duty of exercising slight care;1 the 
host driver is liable in tort to his guest passengers only for conduct that 
is grossly negligent.2 Over the years, the rule has been much litigated; 
2 338Mass. 787,788, 154N.E.2d357, 358(1958). 
3 The case was Grover v. Christian Science Benevolent Assn., Law No. N-14, at 232 
(1969). 
4 356 Mass. 527, 528, 254 N .E.2d 407, 408 ( 1969) (citations omitted). 
5 Amending G.L., c. 231, by inserting §85K. 
6 McKay v. Morgan Memorial Cooperative Indus. and Stores, Inc., 272 Mass. 121, 172 
N.E. 68 (1930). 
§13.5. 1 The rule stems from Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917). 
2 Taylorv. Goldstein, 329Mass. 161, 107 N.E.2d 14 (1952). 
6
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in most instances, the question to be answered was whether the partic-
ular situation created a host-guest relationship-more specifically, 
whether the circumstances would permit a passenger to claim the status 
of an invitee so as to entitle him to recover when the driver was guilty 
of ordinary negligence. 
For years, the host-guest doctrine has served no legitimate purpose. 
Its undesirability is perhaps best illustrated by the rather strange case 
of Wheatley v. Peirce,3 in which the Court held that the owner of a 
motor vehicle could not be considered a guest in his own car. The plain-
tiff, a sports car enthusiast, met the defendant for the first time at a 
cocktail party. The plaintiff owned an automobile that the defendant 
much admired but had never driven. At the plaintiff's suggestion, the 
two went for a ride to savor the delights of the vehicle. After the plain-
tiff had driven the car for a while, the defendant assumed control of the 
wheel at the plaintiff's invitation. While the defendant was putting the 
car through its paces, plaintiff suggested that they go out onto a cause-
way where they could "drive faster" and he urged the defendant to 
"open it.up." Shortly thereafter, just after defendant had navigated the 
same seventy-degree turn in the road through which he had driven in 
the opposite direction some few minutes earlier, the car crashed. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff was not a guest, had not 
assumed the risk, and, therefore, was entitled to recover upon proof of 
ordinary negligence. A jury verdict in his favor was thus upheld.4 
The absurdity evident in the Wheatley decision has finally been elim-
inated by the General Court through Chapter 865 of the Acts of 1971,5 
which abolishes the automobile host-guest distinction and provides 
that "a passenger in the exercise of due care . . . may recover . . . 
upon proof ... of ordinary negligence." The act applies to all causes 
of action arising after January I, 1972. The new statute has no applica-
tion to death actions because the wrongful death statute itself requires 
only a showing of ordinary negligence for recovery.6 It is not clear, 
however, why Chapter 865 requires that the passenger be "in the exer-
cise of due care." The relationship between this language and the com-
parative negligence statute will have to be determined.7 
§13.6. Wrongful death. In 1808, an inferior English court held 
that there was no common law action for wrongful death. 1 The de-
cision has been followed by many American jurisdictions, including 
3 354 Mass. 573,238 N.E.2d858(1968). 
4 The case is noted in 1968Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§3.8, 3.10. 
5 AmendingG.L., c. 231, by inserting§85L. 
6 G.L., c. 229, §2. 
7 The comparative negligence statute is G.L., c. 231, §85, which provides in part: 
"Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person or legal 
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to per-
son or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person 
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, dam-
age or death recovery is made." 
§13.6. 1 Calcerv. Bolton, I Camb. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). 
.. 
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Massachusetts,2 and in those states the creation of a statutory right of 
action has been necessary. Most of the states that have acted legisla-
tively have adopted compensatory statutes permitting survivors to 
recover for their loss; but the General Court has instead treated wrong-
ful death as a quasi-criminal offense, and Massachusetts has enacted 
a statute that permits recovery measured not by the extent of the loss 
sustained by the decedent's survivors but by the extent of the defendant's 
culpability.3 Under the Massachusetts statute, therefore, the amount 
of damages that can be recovered by survivors bears no relationship to 
the loss they may sustain. For many years, the maximum amount of 
recovery permitted under the statute was only $20,000.4 This amount 
was increased to $30,000 in 1962,5 and to $50,000 in 1965.6 By Chapter 
801 of the Acts of 1971,7 the General Court increased the maximum 
recovery to $100,000. 
It is regretful that the General Court has decided to retain the puni-
tive approach of the existing wrongful death statute. Increasing the 
maximum amount of recovery from $50,000 to $100,000 may serve to 
keep some families financially viable, but it will do so only in the small 
number of cases where the defendant is guilty of extreme culpability. 
For the vast majority of survivors, the existing statute remains inade-
quate. The answer is not to be found in successive amendments to the 
statute increasing the maximum permissible recovery, but in the adop-
tion of a compensatory statute that permits recovery without limit. 
Only under such a statute can survivors be reimbursed adequately for 
the losses they sustain through a wrongful death. The present statute 
serves no legitimate purpose other than to limit the amount of recovery 
that insurance companies will be forced to pay; it is today completely 
outdated. 
§13.7. Fraud and deceit: Treble damages. Chapter 450 of the Acts 
of 197ll declares: "Whoever, by deceit or fraud, sells personal property 
shall be liable in tort to a purchaser in treble the amount of damages 
sustained by him." The impact of this statute is not entirely clear. 
Under existing law, the plaintiff may recover either out-of-pocket 
damages or benefit-of-the-bargain damages for deceit.2 The former 
damage theory permits recovery for actual loss; the latter, for expectant 
loss. Under the benefit-of-the-bargain theory, the plaintiff may recover 
the difference between the actual value of the property he received and 
the value he would have received if the property were as represented. 
Under this theory, therefore, the plaintiff may recover damages for his 
2 Careyv. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (I Cush.) 475 (1848). 
3 Mass. G.L., c. 229, §2. 
• Acts of 1958, c. 238, §I. 
5 Acts of 1962, c. 306, §I. 
6 Acts of 1965, c. 683, §I. 
7 AmendingG.L., c. 229, §2. 
§13.7. 1 AmendingG.L., c. 231, by inserting§855. 
2 Ricev. Price, 340Mass. 502, 164 N.E.2d891 (1960). 
8
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expectant loss even though he may have sustained no actualloss. 3 The 
new statute is ambiguous since it does not specify the damage theory 
to be applied. 
It is important to note that a fraudulent state of mind is not an 
element of deceit. As the Supreme Judicial Court has noted, 
it has been held in a long line of cases that "the charge of fraudu-
lent intent, in an action for deceit, may be maintained by proof of 
a statement made, as of the party's own knowledge, which is 
false, provided that the thing stated is not merely a matter of opin-
ion, estimate or j.udgment, but is susceptible of actual knowledge 
and in such cases it is not necessary to make any further proof of 
an actual intent to deceive. "4 
If the statute covers all conduct which could be the subject of a deceit 
action, its impact will indeed be widespread. It is not clear whether 
the General Court intended this result or whether it intended the 
statute to operate only where the defendant had a fraudulent state of 
mind; yet the statute does use the term deceit or fraud, rather than fraud 
alone, and this argues for an expansive interpretation. This would seem 
to strengthen further the argument for limiting recovery to out-of 
pocket damages only. 
§13.8. Trade regulations: Consumer protection. In 1967, the Gen-
eral Court enacted the Regulation of Business Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act. 1 This statute, which became Chapter 93A of the Gen-
eral Laws, is modeled upon Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act2 and is all-encompassing. Its pivotal provision is contained 
in Section 2(a), which declares illegal all "[u]nfair methods of com-
petition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any 
trade or commerce." The scope and coverage of Section 2( a) is revealed 
by Section 2(b ), which expressed the legislative intent that in construing 
Section 2(a), the courts are to be guided by the "interpretations given" 
the federal statute. As a consequence, the scope and coverage of the 
Massachusetts legislation is extensive, for various practices have al-
ready been declared unlawful under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act: 
Among them are "commercial" bribery; payola; coercion or in-
timidation of customers; scare tactics to make sales; threatening 
to initiate collection suits; sales or payments wrongfully forced; 
damaging or withholding customers' property; lotteries or lottery 
devices in sales; failure to fill orders promptly; shipment of un-
ordered goods; and substitution of goods. Disclosure has been 
3 Leaderv. Kolligian, 262 Mass. 63, 159 N.E. 458 (1928). 
4 Powell v. Rasmussen, 355 Mass. 117, 118, 243 N.E.2d 167, 168 (1969), citing Chatham 
Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 404, 18 N.E. 168, 169 (1888). 
§13.8. 1 Acts of 1967, c. 813. 
z 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U .S.C. §45. 
9
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required where there is a change in a product; deceptive appear-
ance as to composition; danger in the use of a product; foreign 
origin of a product; imperfect and rejected goods; a limited num-
ber of products available; and old, used, or second-hand goods. 
Representations as to financial standing, reputation and time in 
business have been held unlawful practices as have those concern-
ing business nature and trade status and affiliations and connec-
tions when such do not in truth exist; Also unlawful are claims of 
disability; government endorsements; comparisons; guarantees 
without disclosures of the nature and extent of the guarantee; and 
therapeutic claims.3 
Section 2(c) of the act further increases its scope by conferring upon the 
attorney general authority to "make rules and regulations interpreting 
the provisions of subsection 2(a)," subject only to the limitation that 
such rules "shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations and 
decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts in-
terpreting the provisions of [Section 5 of the] Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, as from time to time amended." The act provides for both 
public4 and private5 enforcement, permitting recovery of damages 
by private parties as well as equitable relief at the behest of either public 
or private suitors. Specific provision was also made for class actions.6 
Two amendments, one procedural and one substantive, were made 
during the 1971 SuRVEY year. The procedural amendment simply re-
duced the period of notice required for public equitable proceedings 
by the attorney general from ten to five days.7 The substantive amend-
ment relating to private recovery is much more important. The civil 
enforcement provisions of Chapter 93A, which formerly permitted ac-
tions to be brought by "[a ]ny person who purchases or leases goods or 
services," has been amended by Chapter 241 of the Acts of 1971 to per-
mit actions by anyone who purchases or leases "goods, services or 
property real or personal." As a result, the very extensive protection of 
Chapter 93A is now available to purchasers and lessees of realty as well 
as purchasers and lessees of goods and services. 
§13.9. Nuisance: Environmental protection. Under both English 
and American law, a "nuisance" is an interference with the use and 
enjoyment of land. The existence of a nuisance depends upon the cir-
cumstances;1 it is created by one's use of his property in a manner that 
results in a substantial and unreasonable interference with his neigh-
bor's right to the use and enjoyment of his own property.2 The essence 
3 1969Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8.2 at 158-159 (citations omitted). 
4 G.L., c. 93A, §4. 
5 I d. §9. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Actsofl97l,c. 130, amendingG.L., 93A, §4. 
§13.9. 1 Compare Maim v. Dubrey, 325 Mass. 63,88 N.E.2d 900 (1949), with Tortorella 
v. H. Traiser and Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933), and Shae v. National Ice Cream 
Co., 200 Mass. 206, 182 N.E. 303 (1932). 
2 Ferriterv. Herlihy,287 Mass. 138, 191 N.E. 352 (1934). 
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of the tort is a balancing test that imposes upon the plaintiff not only 
the burden of establishing a substantial interference with his use and 
enjoyment of his own property, but also unreasonable conduct on the 
part of the defendant. Serious as is this constraint, however, a far more 
severe limitation exists upon the ability of private citizens to abate 
nuisances that are widespread and affect many people (as does air and 
water pollution, the dissemination of pesticides and herbicides, or the 
destruction of valuable natural areas). Nuisances of this genre tradi-
tionally have been defined as public or common nuisances as opposed 
to private nuisances, a distinction that has a significant substantive 
and remedial impact. 
As a result of fifteenth century decisions of the English courts3 that 
have been faithfully followed by the American judiciary (including 
Massachusetts), only public officials are normally accorded standing 
to abate public or common nuisances.4 This rule persists even though 
the public nuisance degrades the total environment and thereby harms 
every member of the community. It is only when public nuisances also 
create private nuisances (a very complex situation referred to as a 
"mixed nuisance")5 that they are susceptible to private enforcement. 
This traditional distinction between public and private nuisances 
has been changed during the 1971 SuRVEY year. Chapter 732 of the Acts 
of 19716 permits ten or more citizens residing in the Commonwealth 
or any political subdivision of the Commonwealth to sue for equi-
table relief to prevent damage to the environment. The suit must be 
predicated upon a violation of statute, ordinance, bylaw or regulation, 
the major purpose of which is to prevent or minimize environmental 
damage. Further analysis of Chapter. 732 may be found in Chapter 8 
supra; the new statute is mentioned here because of its impact upon the 
traditional Massachusetts law of nuisance. 
B. CouRT DECISIONS 
§13.10. Damages: Contributiop.. For many years prior to 1962, 
Massachusetts followed the general rule that there could be no con-
tribution among tort-feasors, despite intense criticism of the rule and 
a movement away from it by other states. The traditional approach was 
abandoned by statute in 1962,1 but it was not until1971 that the statute 
came before the Supreme Judicial Court for interpretation.2 The case 
3 Y.B. Pasch. 5 Edw. 4, f. 2, pl. 24 (1466); Y.B. Pasch. 2 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 21 (1463); Y.B. 
Trin. 33 Hen. 6, f. 25, pl. 10 (1455). 
4 Perhaps the best explanation offered by the Supreme Judicial Court for this posi-
tion appears in Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 95, 103-104 (1866). 
5 See Cleary v. LicensingCommn. of Cambridge, 345 Mass. 257, 186 N.E.2d 815 (1962); 
Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 95 (1866). 
6 AmendingG.L., c. 214 (equity jurisdiction). 
§13.10. 1 G.L., c. 231B, §1, inserted by Acts of 1962, c. 730, §I. 
2The statute had been commented upon in other cases: Crocker v. New England 
Power Co., 348 Mass. 159, 162, 202 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1964); Selby v. Kuhns, 345 Mass. 
6"..,0, 604-607, 188 N.E.2d 861,864-866 (1963); Hayden v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F. Supp. 267, 
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of O'Mara v. H. P. Hood and Sons3 arose from a traffic accident in 
which the plaintiff was a guest passenger in a car that was being driven 
by her married daughter when it collided with defendant's truck. The 
plaintiff brought an action against the owner and driver of the truck 
for personal injuries sustained in the collision. Defendants, as third-
party plaintiffs, impleaded the plaintiff's host driver as third-party 
defendant, 4 claiming contribution. The case came to the Supreme 
Judicial Court on the defendants' exceptions to directed verdicts 
against them on their contribution claims. 
The accident had occurred during a heavy snowstorm when the 
plaintiff's daughter, the driver of the automobile, became confused and 
turned the wrong way into a one-way street. As she was proceeding up a 
hill at about fifteen miles per hour, approaching an intersection, the 
plaintiff's daughter noticed the defendant's truck approaching the 
intersection from the right. Not wishing to stop and perhaps lose trac-
tion, she continued into the intersection, where the collision occurred. 
The trial court directed verdicts against the defendants on the ground 
that proof of the impleaded host driver's gross negligence was essential 
for contribution in a case brought by a guest passenger against the 
owner and driver of the other vehicle negligently involved in the colli-
sion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, noting that there was a 
sufficient basis for the trial court's finding that the daughter had been 
only ordinarily negligent. 
General Laws, c. 23IB, §l(a) permits contribution "where two or 
more persons become jointly liable in tort for the same injury to per-
son or property." The language seems clearly to require joint liability 
as a prerequisite to contribution. Because the plaintiff's daughter was 
not liable to the plaintiff, there was no joint liability and, therefore, no 
contribution under the statute. The theory behind the statute seems 
to be that "that which could not be accomplished directly, namely, 
recovery by the guest from the host, ought not to be accomplished in-
directly by contribution."5 
The O'Mara case will no longer create a problem under the con-
tribution statute, since the duty now owed by a host driver to a guest 
passenger has recently been changed, by statute, to that of ordinary 
care.6 A similar issue could arise, however, in the context of an intra-
family immunity. It would seem from the Court's handling of O'Mara 
that in an action brought by a wife against a negligent defendant, the 
defendant could not implead the plaintiff's husband as a third-party 
defendant, because the interspousal immunity doctrine would pro-
hibit the necessary joint liability. 
§13.11. Damages: Mental distress. As has been repeatedly pointed 
271 (D. Mass. 1967). 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 553, 268 N .E.2d 685. 
4 The question of intrafamily immunity was not involved in the case on appeal. 
5 Shonka v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 1178, 1182, !52 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1967); Burmeister 
v. Youngstrom, 81 S.D. 578, 139 N.W.2d 226 (1965). 
6 See Acts of 1971, c. 865, discussed in §I3.5supra. 
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out in the ANNUAL SURVEY, 1 the general rule in Massachusetts govern-
ing compensation for damages resulting from mental disturbance stems 
from the turn-of-the-century decision of the Supreme Judicial Court 
in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R.Z In Spade, the Court held that "there 
can be no recovery for fright, terror, alarm, anxiety or distress of mind, 
if these are unaccompanied by some physical injury; and ... also 
... that there can be no recovery for such mental disturbance, where 
there is no injury to the person from without."3 Although the Supreme 
Judicial Court has consistently adhered to this general rule, 4 its de-
cisions in recent years have contained some language suggesting pos-
sible change.5 During the 1971 SuRVEY year, the Court again had 
occasion to reexamine the issue, this time in the context of a case arising 
under a loophole to the Spade rule. The loophole had been recognized 
as early as 1899 by Chief Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes in Smith v. 
Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 6 wherein the Chief Justice noted with 
respect to the Spade rule that 
(t]he decisions leave open the question whether, if the harm to the 
plaintiff was actually foreseen and intended, that would make a 
difference. It is possible that in some cases motive and actual intent 
would be more considered in this commonwealth than they would 
be in England. That question may be left until it arises.7 
The open question finally came before the Court for decision in 1971. 
In George v. jordan Marsh Co.,8 discussed in detail later in this chap-
ter,9 the Supreme Judicial Court limited the Spade rule by holding that 
a plaintiff may recover damages for intentionally caused "emotional 
distress," 10 even though no other recognized tort was committed. 11 
The Court carefully noted, however, that in remanding the case for 
trial on the merits, it was not ruling "on the legal sufficiency of allega-
§13.1 I. 1 1970Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.6; 1968 id. §3.4; 1960 id. §§3.4, 6.1 I. 
2 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), discussed in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§3.4, 
6.1]. 
3 Id. at290, 47 N .E. at89. 
4 See, e.g., Sullivan v. H. P. Hood and Sons, 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960), dis-
cussed in 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.6; 1968 id. §3.4; 1960 id. §3.4. 
5 See, e.g., Skelton v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1408, 263 N.E.2d 
465; Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
343, 256 N .E.2d 311, discussed in 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.6; Proulx v. Bas banes, 
354 Mass. 559, 238 N.E.2d 531 (1968), discussed in 1968 Ann Surv. Mass. Law §3.4. 
6 174Mass.576,55N.E.380(1899). 
7 Id.at578,55N.E.at381. 
8 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 563,268 N.E.2d 915. 
9 See the student comment,§ 13.20 infra. 
10 The Court indicated that the term emotional distress as used throughout its opin-
ion was "intended to apply to what has been \'ariously called or referred to as mental 
anguish, mental suffering, mental disturbance, mental humiliation, nervous shock, 
emotional disturbance, distress of mind, fright, terror, alarm and anxiety." 1971 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 563 n.l, 268 N.E.2d 915 n.l. 
11 The Court stated: "We start our discussion of this question by holding that the rule 
laid down in the Spade case does not apply to bar recovery for emotional distress result-
ing from acts intended to produce such results, or to bar recovery for physical injuries 
13
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tions of negligent, grossly negligent, wanton or reckless conduct caus-
ing severe emotional distress resulting in bodily injury, or on the legal 
sufficiency of allegations of distress without resulting bodily injury. 12 
§13.12. Damages: Loss of consortium. Over a vigorous dissent, 
the Supreme Judicial Court decided in Lombardo v. D. F. Frangioso 
and Co. 1 to adhere to its 60-year-old rule denying both husbands and 
wives the right to recover for loss of consortium growing out of a de-
fendant's negligent injury to the other spouse.2 Referring to the con-
tention of the Judicial Council that recognition of the right to recover 
for consortium would permit "by far the most speculative variety of 
damages under the sun,"3 and emphasizing that its holding related to 
negligence claims only,4 the majority reaffirmed its rule that "there 
may be no recovery, based on negligence, for loss of a spouse's services, 
or for loss of consortium, apart from a husband's right (based upon his 
duty to support) to reimbursement of medical and closely related expen-
ses incurred for the care of an injured wife."5 Any change or modifica-
tion of this principle, the majority concluded, "should be accomplished 
by the Legislature and not by judicial decision."6 
Chief Justice Tauro, joined by Justices Spiegel and Braucher, dis-
sented in a lengthy opinion summarizing and highlighting the illogic 
of the decisional history of consortium litigation in Massachusetts. 
The dissenting Justices felt that a complete reexamination of the issue 
was necessary.· Pointing to developments in other jurisdictions7 and 
to the action of the American Law Institute8 in recognizing the right 
to recovery for loss of consortium by wives as well as by husbands, the 
dissenters argued that it was improper for the Court to act on the ration-
ale that change should originate in the legislature. They pointed out 
resulting from emotional distress thus produced. The defendants' contention to the con-
trary is rejected. Whatever may be said for or against the rule of the Spade case, it has no 
application to this case." Id. at 567, 268 N.E.2d at 917-918. 
12 Id. at 573,268 N .E.2d at 921. 
§13.12. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873,269 N.E.2d836. 
2 The rule dates from the decision in Feneff v. New York City & Hudson River R.R. 
203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909). 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873,875 n.3, 269 N.E.2d 836, 837 n.3, citing and quoting from the 
Forty-sixth Report of the Massachusetts Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144 at 76-78 
(1970). The Judicial Council was specifically criticizing House Bill 2364 (1970). 
4 1971 Mass.Adv. Sh. 873,874 n.l, 269N.E.2d836, 837 n.l. 
5 Id. at874-875, 269N.E.2dat837. 
6 Id. at875, 269 N.E.2dat837. 
7 The dissenters noted that in the two decades since the decision of the federal Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. 
Cir. 1950) (wife could sue for loss of consortium where injury to husband resulted from 
negligence of third party), a substantial number of jurisdictions have likewise followed 
suit and modified their law. At the time of the opinion in the Lombardo case, 43 juris-
dictions recognized a right to recover for loss of consortium, and 26 of these permitted 
recovery by either husband or wife. The cases are collected in the dissent, 1971 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 873, 879 n.l, 269 N.E.2d 836, 839-840. n.l. 
8 The American Law Institute has tentatively approved a right for the wife to recover 
for loss of consortium. Restatement of Torts Second §695 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969). 
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that the 60-year-old rule denying recovery for consortium was itself a 
judicial modification of earlier cases,9 and that the Court had in the 
past found it necessary in similar circumstances to act judicially to 
change existing law without awaiting legislative action. 10 Since the 
evolution of the consortium doctrine has been almost exclusively judi-
cial and in Massachusetts results from judicial modification of early 
cases,ll the dissenters felt it was improper "to direct our citizens to 
look solely to the Legislature for redress." 12 They also dismissed the 
often-expressed fear that permitting consortium claims by wives could 
result in double daV}ages recoveries13 as being empirically unsound14 
and, in any event, easily avoided. 15 
It should be noted that the Court's decision in Lombardo has no 
affect on its earlier decisions permitting recovery for loss of consortium 
for intentional interference with the marital relationship in criminal 
conversation, enticement, or adultery cases. 16 
§13.13. False imprisonment: Shoplifting. In 1958, the General 
Court permitted merchants to "detain" customers "in a reasonable 
manner and for not more than a reasonable length of time" without 
liability "if there were reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
so detained was committing or attempting to commit larceny." 1 In 
Coblyn v. Kennedy's Inc.,z a merchant who had detained a customer 
without probable cause was denied the protection of the statute in an 
action for false imprisonment. · 
At common law, in an action for false imprisonment the merchant 
9 See the discussion of cases in I 97 I Mass. Adv. Sh. 873, 876-878, 269 N .E. 836, 838-839. 
10 I d. at882, 269 N.E.2dat842. 
11 E.g., see Bolger v. Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910), over· 
ruling Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 84 N.E. 141 (1908); Duffee v. Boston Elevated Ry., 
191 Mass. 563, 77 N.E. 1036 (1906); Kelley v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 
168 Mass. 308, 46 N.E. 1063 (1897). 
12 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873, 880, 269 N.E.2d 836, 841. The most recent example of 
judicial initiative is Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1970), in 
which the Court declared, in effect, that the charitable immunity doctrine would be over-
turned unless the legislature codified it. Another example of the Court's initiative was the 
adoption in 1965 of deposition or "oral discovery" procedures, in spite of some long-
standing legislative opposition to those procedures. 
13 Since loss of consortium includes within its scope loss of support, which would 
be an element of damages implicitly contained in the husband's recovery for diminished 
earning capacity, it has been argued that a right to recover for loss of consortium might 
result in a double recovery. See discussion in 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873, 879, 269 N.E.2d 
836, 840. 
14 The experience of the jurisdictions that have recognized the cause of action seems 
to indicate that no significant problems have resulted. See id. at 883, 269 N.E.2d at 842. 
15 The Justices felt that proper jury instructions would avoid an untoward result, 
and they noted further that the problem would be minimized by a joint trial of both the 
husband's and wife's causes of action, which should be consolidated if filed separately. 
ld. at 880, 269 N.E.2d at 840. 
16 I d. at 874 n.l., 269 N .E.2d at 837 n.l. 
§13. 13. 1 G.L., c. 231, §94B, inserted by Acts of 1958, c. 337. 
2 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 635,268 N.E.2d860. 
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was accorded the defense of probable cause, which was measured by 
the "reasonable man" standard. The defendant in Coblyn argued that 
since the statute used the words "reasonable grounds" instead of 
"probable cause," the legislature intended the change in terminology 
to indicate that a subjective test as to the merchant's honesty and the 
strength of his suspicion was to be used in determining the availability 
of the statutory privilege. Rejecting such an interpretation, the Court 
noted that the two terms generally were used interchangeably and 
concluded that the subjective test urged by the defendants would 
"afford the merchant even greater authority than that given to a police 
officer. "3 
During the 1971 SuRVEY year, the legislature amended the detention 
statute to make it applicable not only to the suspected larceny of the 
merchant's goods, but also to the larceny of the personal property of 
employees and customers on the merchant's premises.4 The amend-
ment simply enlarges the category of personal property covered by the 
statute; it does not enlarge the category of persons entitled to the pro-
tection of the statutory privilege. Thus, while the property of em-
ployees and customers is protected by the statute, the employees and 
customers themselves may not invoke its protection. The rationale be-
hind the amendment's distinction is probably a recognition that mer-
chants need special tools to combat shoplifting, a problem faced only 
by merchants, while the ordinary citizen is already protected by his 
common law right to recapture stolen articles and has no need for 
special statutory privileges. 
§13.14. Defamation: Public figure. For the second year in a row, 
the Supreme Judicial Court was presented with a defamation case re-
quiring interpretation of the "public figure" defense as expounded by 
the Supreme Court in Sullivan v. New York Times.l Last year the 
Court refused to expand the public· figure category to include an in-
dividual who "had been an intermittent candidate for minor elective 
public office, a seeker of appointment to unimportant public office, and 
campaign manager for a small minority candidate for mayor of Bos-
ton."2 During the 1971 SuRVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that one who had become a suspect in the "Great Plymouth Mail Rob-
bery" and who had publicized this fact-largely through his own 
actions in talking to newspaper reporters and holding press confer-
ences to profess his innocence-had "moved from obscurity to notori-
ety"3 and could not recover damages for defamation, absent proof of 
actual malice. The Court likened the case to that of the "Boston 
Strangler," in which the federal District Court for Massachusetts 
5 Id. at 639-640,268 N .E.2d at 863. 
• Acts of 1971, c. 447. 
§13.14. •376U.S.254(1964). 
2 Lewisv. Vallis, 356Mass. 662,668,255 N.E.2d337, 341 (1970). 
5 Tripoli v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 461, 466, 268 N.E.2d 
350, 353. 
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had held that the "exceptional public interest" in the case and the 
"extensive publicity surrounding plaintiff as a possible 'Boston Stran-
gler' " precluded an action for defamation or invasion of privacy, ab-
sent proof that the publication was "knowingly false or falsely made 
with reckless disregard for the truth. "4 
Great impact upon the future development of the Massachusetts law 
of defamation was caused by the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., in which the Court held 
that the First Amendment protects "all discussion and communications 
involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to 
whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous."5 The case 
arose out of a series of actions brought by the city of Philadelphia to 
enforce its obscenity laws. In the course of several raids, the police 
arrested the plaintiff, a distributor of nudist magazines, and seized his 
inventory of magazines and books warehoused in his home and in a 
barn. The facts of the raid were reported several times during news 
broadcasts over the defendant's radio station. Subsequently, plaintiff 
was acquitted of criminal obscenity charges under instructions of the 
trial judge that, as a matter of law, the nudist magazines distributed by 
the plaintiff were not obscene. Thereafter, plaintiff brought a defama-
tion action in federal court against the defendant, alleging that its news 
broadcasts were libelous per se and otherwise defamatory. From a jury 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appealed. The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the public figure 
defense announced in New York Times and developed in later cases6 
shielded the defendant. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the narrow 
question raised was whether the defendant had any constitutional pro-
tection despite the fact that the plaintiff was neither a "public official" 
nor a "public figure," but only a "private individual." In sustaining 
the court of appeals, the Supreme Court stated: 
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot sud-
denly become less so merely because a private individual is involved 
or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" 
choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the 
event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the 
content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the partici-
pant's prior anonymity or notoriety.7 
The Rosenbloom decision has already been followed by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Priestley v. Hastings and Sons Publishing Co.; 8 the 
Court, relying upon Rosenbloom, held that newspaper stories report-
4 DeSalvo v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corps., 300 F. Supp. 742, 747 (D. Mass. 
1969). 
5 403 u.s. 29,44 (1971). 
6 See id. at30 n.l; l970Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.7. 
7 403 u.s. 29,43 (1971). 
BI97l Mass. Adv. Sh. 1265, 271 N.E.2d 628. This case is more fully discussed in the 
student comment, §16.10 infra. 
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ing allegations of misconduct made at a selectmen's meeting concern-
ing the work performed by an architect in the construction of a school 
building were not actionable without proof of actual malice. The 
Court indicated the scope of the new doctrine thusly: 
The publication here, as [in Rosenbloom], related to the plain-
tiff's involvement in an event of public or general concern. In 
addition, the defendant newspaper here, like the radio station 
there, performed much the same function of conveying news to 
the public under time constraints which did not permit the inves-
tigative work to which those connected with a magazine or book 
could more reasonably be held.9 
§13.15. Proximate cause: Sudden emergency. The case of Wilborg 
v. DenzeW involved an interesting question as to the liability of a 
motorist who runs out of gas. On its facts, the case was simple. The de-
fendant, who had driven 175 miles on the day in question, was driving 
uphill when his car ran out of gas. The car came to a halt about 6 
inches from the double yellow line in the center of the road, approxi-
mately 165 feet from the crest of the hill. Between 15 seconds and 2 
minutes after the defendant stopped, another car traveling in the same 
direction as the defendant pulled over into the other side of the road in 
order to pass the defendant's stalled vehicle. At the same time, the plain-
tiff, traveling in the opposite direction, drove over the crest of the hill 
and saw the headlights of the two cars in front of her blocking both 
sides of the road. She became terrified and veered to the right off the 
road, striking a tree at a point about opposite to the defendant's stalled 
car. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant 
appealed, claiming he was entitled to a directed verdict, apparently on 
the ground that there was no evidence of negligence on his part and 
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 2 In affirming, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the jury properly could have con-
cluded that the defendant was negligent in running out of gasoline, 
failing to take advantage of the 30-second "sputtering" warning pro-
vided by the engine to pull his car to the side of the road, and in not 
immediately moving his car to the side of the road after it had stalled. 
"Since it is reasonably foreseeable that a following car may pass a 
stalled car,"3 said the Court, the defendant's negligence could have 
constituted a proximate cause of the accident. 
The more difficult question for the Court concerned the action of the 
plaintiff, since the collision might not have occurred had she remained 
on the road. However, the Court found the plaintiff's aqions inde-
terminative, since the plaintiff was faced with a sudden emergency. 
9 Id. at 1269-1270,271 N.E.2dat631. 
§13.15. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.597,268N.E.2d855. 
2 The defendant also claimed faulty jury instrudions, evidentiary errors, and Im-
proper judicial remarks. 
' 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 597,598-599,268 N.E.2d855, 857. 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/16
§13.16 TORTS 327 
The Court relied upon its earlier statement of the sudden emergency 
doctrine: 
"Though in retrospect it may appear that the plaintiff's choice of 
a course of action was mistaken, we cannot say as a matter of law 
that at the time he made the choice, in view of the need of speedy 
decision and action, it was not a prudent one under the circum-
stances of the case. 'A choice may be mistaken and yet prudent.' " 4 
§13.16. Interference with advantageous relationships. For some 
time, Massachusetts law has followed the rule that "one who, without 
a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third per-
son not to ... enter into or continue a business relation with an-
other"1 is liable in tort for the harm thereby caused. 2 The validity of 
the rule has again been affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court. In 
Pino v. Trans-Atlantic Marine, Inc., 3 the Court upheld a seaman's 
claim that an insurer had unlawfully interfered with his employment 
opportunities by denying insurance coverage to fishing vessels that 
employed the seaman, under circumstances in which it was reasonably 
foreseeable that employment opportunities would be lost if vessel 
owners could not acquire insurance protection against the possible 
injury claims of the seaman. The insurer's main defense was that it 
"had the right not to issue protection coverage on individuals [it] did 
not want to insure in the absence of statutory or other regulations. " 4 
The Court never reached the validity of the defense.5 It agreed with 
the trial court that the insurer's asserted justification that its action 
was predicated upon the plaintiff's attempt to recover on a baseless 
claim was itself groundless. In upholding the award of damages and 
an injunctive decree against the defendants, the Court concluded that 
it was immaterial that the plaintiff had been employed under a con-
tract terminable at will. The Court stated: 
While "malice in common acceptation means ill will against a per-
son ... in its legal sense it means a wrongful act, done inten-
tionally, without just cause or excuse." ... The defendants' 
"motives" may have been "good" from their point of view, in that 
their conduct may have been financially beneficial to them, but 
their conduct can still be held "malicious in law." We have held 
4 I d. at599, 268 N .E.2d at857-858. 
§13.16. 1 Restatement of Torts, §766. 
2 Cf. Owen v. Williams, 322 Mass. 356,77 N.E.2d 318 (1918). 
3 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1663,265 N .E.2d583. 
4 I d. at 1667,265 N .E.2d at586. 
5 The defense is ordinarily sound. In the absence of a statutory obligation or a con-
spiracy, one may refuse to contract with another regardless of motive. For example, in 
Gordon v. Worcester Telegram Pub. Co., 343 Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586 (1961), a de-
murrer was sustained in a case in which the defendant newspaper arbitrarily refused to 
accept plaintiff's advertisements. As the Pino case shows, however, refusal to contract 
with a third party in order to interfere with a business relationship between the third 
party and the plaintiff may be actionable. 
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that "[i]f such interference was intentional and without lawful 
justification it was malicious in law although it arose from good 
motives and without express malice. "6 
§13.17. Trademarks: Unfair competition: Passing off. A relatively 
simple case involving the tort generally known as unfair competition 
came before the federal District Court for Massachusetts during the 
1971 SuRVEY year. The case is noteworthy only because it involves the 
conduct of a distributor or authorized reseller in "passing off" goods 
of other manufacturers for those of the plaintiff. In Pic Design Corp. 
v. Bearings Specialty Co., 1 the plaintiff, a manufacturer of precision 
industrial components, sought a preliminary injunction against a 
distributor of precision industrial components. The plaintiff sought 
to prevent the distributor from filling orders with products of other 
manufacturers when the orders were for component products identi-
fied either by the plaintiff's name and catalogue number or by plain-
tiff's catalogue number alone. An injunction was granted on the 
ground that irreparable injury would be visited upon the plaintiff, 
not merely in the loss of sales but also by possible damage to the plain-
tiff's goodwill because of allegedly inferior substitute merchandise. 
The fact that the defendant had begun invoicing the substituted prod-
ucts as "substitutes" was deemed immaterial. The Court reasoned 
that "[a] purchaser should be told at the time that he is ordering that a 
substitute article will be sent. Only at that time will the customer's 
decision, whether to accept delivery of the substitute or to seek the 
genuine product, be truly free."2 
C. STUDENT COMMENTS 
§13.18. Products liability: Privity of contract entombed. On Au-
gust 18, 1971, Governor Sargent signed the bill that ended the privity 
defense in products liability actions brought in Massachusetts. 1 The 
legislature acted after it became clear that the Supreme Judicial Court 
would not move to abolish the privity doctrine.2 Anyone who wishes 
to trace the history of products liability litigation in the Commonwealth 
should consult the four immediately preceding volumes of the SuRvEv;3 
this comment will examine the new legislation, with particular em-
phasis on the experience of jurisdictions that have preceded Massa-
chusetts in doing away with the privity defense. The text of the new 
6 1970Mass. Adv. Sh. 1663,1668-1669,265 N.E.2d583, 587. (Citations omitted.) 
§13.17. 1 317F.Supp.326(D.Mass.l970). 
2 ld. at 328, citing Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. Leterstone Sales Co., 27 F. Supp. 
736, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1939). 
§13.18. 1 House Bill 4805 was enacted as Chapter 670 of the Acts of 1971, amending 
G. L., c. 106, §2-318. 
2 The Supreme Judicial Court had upheld the privity requirement most recently in 
Nektas v. General Motors Corp., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 843, 259 N.E.2d 234. See 1970 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §2.1. 
3 See 1970Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§2.1, 2.2; 1969 id. §l.l; 1968 id§3.3; 1967 id. §3.4. 
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statute, which is an amendment to the Uniform Commercial Code, is 
as follows: 
Section 1. Chapter 106 of the General Laws is hereby amended 
by striking out section 2-318, as appearing in section I of chapter 
765 of the acts of 1957, and inserting in place thereof the following 
section: 
Section 2-318. Lack of Privity in Actions Against a Manufac-
turer, Seller or Supplier of Goods. 
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no de-
fense in any action brought against the manufacturer, seller or 
supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, ex-
press or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not 
purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a per-
son whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably 
have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. A manu-
facturer, seller, or supplier may not exclude or limit the operation 
of this section. 
Section 2. Section 2-318 of chapter 106 of the General Laws, as 
amended by section one of this act, shall apply to sales made on or 
after the effective date of this act. 
The legislation appears to go beyond the traditional scope of the Uni-
form Commercial Code by including negligence as a basis for recovery 
in addition to the usual action for breach of warranty. In most situa-
tions, however, a plaintiff is likely to find that an action for negli-
gence will be difficult to sustain. For example, as to a manufacturer, 
the plaintiff would have to prove that there had been negligence in 
some phase of production, either in design, manufacture, or inspec-
tion of the goods which were allegedly defective. A plaintiff may be 
hard-pressed to present evidence of such fault where a complex pro-
duction process is involved. For its part, the manufacturer will usually 
present expert testimony or other substantial evidence as to the care it 
employs in protecting against defects in its goods.4 
A plaintiff will usually have an easier time proceeding under a war-
ranty theory. Implied warranties arise as a matter of law under Sections 
2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In order to hold the 
defendant liable for the breach of an implied warranty, the plaintiff 
must show that when the goods left the defendant's hands they either 
were not of merchantable quality5 or were not fit for their intended 
purpose.6 In the latter case, the plaintiff must also show that the de-
fendant had reason to know the particular purpose for which the 
goods were to be used. As in strict liability actions, it is still necessary 
to demonstrate that the goods were defective, that the defect ·was the 
proximate cause of the injury, and that the defect is traceable to the 
4 See Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
Yale L.J. 1099, 1116 (1960). 
sucC§2-314. 
6 UCC§2-315. 
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defendant. There is, however, no need to tie the defective product to the 
defendant's negligence; it is sufficient that the defect can be traced to 
him.7 
The new legislation specifies that manufacturers, sellers, and sup-
pliers of goods may not limit or disclaim the operation of the anti-
privity statute. In 1970, the legislature acted in a similar fashion (a) 
to prevent manufacturers or sellers of consumer goods or services from 
excluding or modifying any implied warranties which would other-
wise attach; and (b) to restrict the circumstances in which a manufac-
turer of consumer goods may limit or modify a consumer's remedies 
for breach of the manufacturer's express warranties.8 As a result of 
the aforementioned actions of the legislature in limiting disclaimers, 
it is the law in Massachusetts that a seller or manufacturer of consumer 
goods must honor his implied warranties of merchantability and fit-
ness for a particular purpose. 
A first-impression interpretation of an important and broad new 
law is unquestionably a formidable responsibility for any court. In 
determining situations to which the new antiprivity statute is applica-
ble, Massachusetts courts will be aided by precedents from other juris-
dictions9 that have adopted very similar statutes as part of their com-
mercial codes. 10 Among the states that have moved toward more com-
prehensive products liability, three have enacted statutory provisions 
very similar to those of Massachusetts: Virginia (l962),ll Arkansas 
(1965), 12 and Maine (1969).13 
The heart of G.L., c. 106, §2-318 is the sentence in Section I that 
provides: 
7 See Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a 
Defect, 41 Texas L. Rev. 855 (1963). 
8 G.L., c. 106, §2-316A, added by the Acts of 1970, c. 880, provides: "The provisions 
of section 2-316 shall not apply to sales of consumer goods, services or both. Any lan-
guage, oral or written, used by a seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services, 
which attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify the consumer's remedies for 
breach of those warranties, shall be unenforceable. 
"Any language, oral or written, u'sed by a manufacturer of consumer goods, which 
attempts to limit or modify a consumer's remedies for breach of such manufacturer's 
express warranties, shall be unenforceable, unless such manufacturer maintains facili· 
ties within the commonwealth sufficient to provide reasonable and expeditious perfor-
mance of the warranty obligations." Foran analysis of Section 2-316A, see 1970 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §9.2. 
It should be noted that the new Section 2-318 is applicable to "suppliers" of goods, 
as well as to manufacturers and sellers. However, the term suppliers does not appear in 
Section 2-316A. 
9 If a Massachusetts statute being interpreted for the first time is virtually identical to 
statutes that have been interpreted judicially in other jurisdictions, Massachusetts courts 
have been willing to follow such interpretations. See, e.g., Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ral-
ston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 35 (1964) (case involving UCC); Kurtiss v. Conrad and Co., 312 
Mass. 670, 46 N.E.2d 12 ( 1942) (case involving Uniform Sales Act). 
10 SeegenerallyWillierandHart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest§§l-100.1 to 1-101 (1971). 
11 Acts of 1962, c. 476, §8-654.3, as amended; Va. Code Ann. §8.2-318 (Supp. 1965). 
12 Ark. Stat. Ann. §85-2-318.1 (Supp. 1967). 
13 Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit.li,§2-318(Supp.l970). 
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Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no de-
fense in any action brought against the manufacturer, seller or 
supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, ex-
press or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not 
purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a per-
son whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably 
have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. 
The provision quoted above is identical to that in the Maine statute. 
Virginia and Arkansas have the same kind of provision, except that a 
"supplier" of goods is not included as a' potential defendant. 
It may be useful to inquire why the term supplier was included in 
the code provision of Maine and Massachusetts, 14 for the word is 
neither defined nor used in the Uniform Commercial Code. However, 
since products liability is treated in tort as well as commercial law, it 
is not surprising that the term is used extensively in a chapter of the 
Restatement of Torts. Chapter 14 of the Restatement deals generally 
with the liability of "suppliers of chattels." In a note to Chapter 14, 
which states the rules applicable to all suppliers, it is explained that 
the rules "are equally applicable to all persons who in any way or for 
any purpose supply chattels for the use of others or permit others to 
use their chattels. " 15 Gratuitous donors, lessors, and bailors would 
be included. It seems unlikely that the legislature, in drafting the new 
Section 2-318, intended this far-reaching definition to attach to the 
term supplier. The legislators may have been making a policy judg-
ment as to the sources from which implied warranties should arise as 
a matter of law. However, since the statute appears in the sales article 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, there should be a strong presump-
tion that it was not intended to apply to such defendants as gratuitous 
donors, lessors, and bailors. The Restatement itself promulgates rules 
of liability peculiar to various kinds of suppliers. 16 Since these pro-
visions differentiate categories within the broad class of suppliers, 
there would seem to be some logical basis for categorizing those sup-
pliers whose transactions in goods would be governed by the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The next step is to determine the types of suppliers 
to which Section 2-318 would apply. 
In referring to the decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.Y 
Prosser described a general rule limiting the type of supplier liable for 
harm caused by defective goods: "It has become, in short, a general rule 
imposing negligence liability upon any supplier, for remuneration, of 
any chattel." 18 (Emphasis added.) In a footnote to this comment 
14 The inclusion of the term supplier is also discussed in §13.3 supra. 
15 Restatement ofTortsSecond c. 14, Topic I, scope note. 
16 Topic 2 of Chapter 14 deals with those rules that determine the liability of persons 
supplying chattels to be used for their business purposes; Topic 3 deals with manufac-
turers' liability; Topic 4, vendors; Topic 5, strict liability; Topic 6, independent con-
tractors; Topic 7, donors, lendors, and lessors. · 
17 217 N.J. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916). The court in the MacPherson case overturned 
the rule requiring privity in negligence cases. 
18 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale 
23
Donovan: Chapter 13: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
332 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.18 
there is a further explanation: "Gratuitous lenders, bailors and donors 
are . . . liable only for failure to disclose defects of which they have 
knowledge, which may make it dangerous to third persons." 19 
Limiting the class of suppliers to those who receive some form of 
remuneration would appear to be consistent with the Uniform Com-
mercial Code's notion of "seller," which is defined in Section 2-l03(d) 
as "a person who sells or contracts to sell goods." Furthermore, those 
who are sellers under the code definition are the ones on whom the code 
imposes warranties, although an implied warranty of merchantability 
under Section 2-314 will not attach unless the seller is also a merchant20 
with respect to the goods he sells. In understanding the code defini-
tion of merchant, it is useful to consider the official comments to Sec-
tion 2-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Comment I states that 
"[t]his Article assumes that transactions between professionals in a 
given field require special and clear rules which may not apply to a 
casual or inexperienced seller or buyer." (Emphasis added.) Comment 
2 explains that "[t]he professional status under the definition may be 
based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized know-
ledge as to business practices, or specialized knowledge as to both. . . . '' 
Read as a whole, the new Section 2-318 is strikingly broad in its 
scope, and the use of the term supplier may serve the important func-
tion of demonstrating a legislative intent to liberalize the law of prod-
ucts liability by using language which is amorphous and capable of 
being interpreted equitably rather than strictly. In construing Vir-
ginia's statute, one authority has pointed out the need for flexible 
interpretation of the term seller: "[T]he statute includes within the 
classification of a 'seller' any party who is engaged in the business of 
selling goods such as wholesalers, dealers, distributors and retailers. "21 
However, some courts do not agree that the term seller applies to re-
tailers or wholesalers. 22 This may explain why Maine and Massa-
chusetts have made their antiprivity statutes applicable to suppliers, 
i.e., to extend the list of potential defendants23 beyond the limits 
created in some jurisdictions that have restricted the meaning of seller. 24 
L.j. 1099, 1102 (1960). 
19 I d. at II 02 n.23. 
20 UCC §2-104( I) defines merchant as "a person who deals in goods of the kind or 
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to 
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill 
may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by 
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill." 
21 Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in Products Liability 
Cases, 48 Va. L. Rev. 982, 986 (1962). 
22 See cases cited in Emroch, id. at 986. 
23 For a list of potential defendants in cases of negligence without privity, see Prosser, 
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 824-817 
(1966). Because the antiprivity statute makes no distinction as to the liability of poten-
tial defndants in either negligence or warranty cases, the dasses of defendants in negli-
gence cases may be included in the list comprising those in breach of warranty cases. 
Emroch, n.21 supra. 
24 For a discussion of the wholesaler's status in products liability cases, see Note, Prod-
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Lengthening the list of potential defendants does not in itself 
guarantee a broader base of remedial rights for purchasers, users, or 
consumers of defective goods. What was needed to broaden these 
rights and what was supplied by the new Section 2-318 was a clear 
abrogation of the requirement that a plaintiff show contractual privity 
with the defendant. With the privity requirement removed, a new test 
of plaintiff-defendant association was provided: the plaintiff must be 
"a person whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably 
have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods." The lan-
guage used by the legislature indicates an intent to have the courts 
apply principles of fo.reseeability25 in determining whether the de-
fendant could have expected the plaintiff to come in conta\t with the 
allegedly defective product. The question is usually one of fact; how-
ever, if the case raises no factual issues, the determination becomes a 
matter of law.26 Obviously, it is too early to predict judicial limits 
that might be placed on the "foreseeable" plaintiff in Massachusetts. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that any general rules of foreseeability will 
emerge, since products liability cases are so varied in factual character. 
While recognizing the need for a case-by-case determination of fore-
seeability, there should also be a recognition by Massachusetts courts 
of cases from jurisdictions that have adopted strict liability. Other 
jurisdictions, proceeding under either a strict liability or warranty 
theory, have allowed recovery to the following classes of plaintiffs: re-
mote purchasers, employees, users or consumers, bailees, lessees, pas-
sengers, and rescuers. 27 The most difficult area in which to apply the 
principle of foreseeability will be in cases where the plaintiff was a 
bystander-someone other than a user or consumer of a product-who 
suffered some form of injury. Evidence as to circumstances under which 
the injury occurred should be relevant. For example, it may be im-
portant to determine whether the plaintiff bystander was lawfully at 
the place where the harm occurred;28 whether one could reasonably 
have expected him to be there; and whether, from their nature, the 
ucts Liability-Wholesaler-Economic Loss, 19 Me. L. Rev. 92 (1967). 
25 See Carter v. Yardley and Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946), for a discussion 
of the foreseeability issue in the context of products liability cases involving negligence. 
26 In Mack Trucks v. Jet Asphalt and Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, 107, 437 S.W.2d 459, 
462 (1969), the court, construing Arkansas' antiprivity statute, said that "[not) every re-
mote purchaser or user could recover for a breach of implied warranty of fitness for the 
purpose. Whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such a one would use the product 
would usually become a question of fact. Here, however, the sale and lease took place 
approximately one month after the original sale. Repairs were made over a period of 
months upon the complaints of Jet. Under these circumstances the trial court's holding, 
as a matter of law, that lack of privity was not a defense, was correct." 
27 The important cases are discussed in 2 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability 
§16A[4)[c) (Supp. 1970). 
2s In Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 98-99, 64 N .E.2d 693, 697 (1946), the Su-
preme Judicial Court indicated that it would limit recovery in negligence actions to plain-
tiffs who were not trespassers or bare licensees, even though such persons may have been 
foreseen. The new Section 2-318 places no such limitation on recovery, and thus Massa-
chusetts courts may have to reevaluate the position taken in Yardley. 
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defective or dangerous goods in question could foreseeably have caused 
the alleged harm. 
An important case allowing bystander recovery under a theory of 
strict tort liability29 was decided by the Supreme Court of California 
in 1969. Elmore v. American Motors Corp. 30 allowed recovery against 
an automobile manufacturer and a dealer by an injured occupant of 
an automobile that was struck by the defective car after the improperly 
.connected drive shaft of the defective car had dropped off, causing the 
vehicle to swerve out of control. The court announced a definite policy 
as to bystanders: it would follow the public policy rationale of another 
California case31 which held, by imposing strict liability, that a manu-
facturer who has placed a defective product on the market will bear the 
cost of compensating an innocent plaintiff who is injured by that 
product. The Elmore court also felt that a manufacturer can often fore-
see that a bystander may be injured by his product, and that foreseeable 
bystanders should perhaps be given greater protection than users or 
consumers, who have the opportunity to inspect and select the goods 
that they purchase. The court also reasoned that the manufacturer 
and retailer can adjust their costs so as to account for any potential 
liability to bystanders.32 
Cited in the Elmore opinion was the case of Piercefield v. Reming-
ton Arms Co.,33 the first case to allow a bystander to recover for in-
juries under a strict products liability theory. The plaintiff was injured 
when the barrel of a shotgun, fired by his brother, exploded. He re-
covered damages against the manufacturer of the shell which was 
fired and against the wholesaler and retailer of the shell. As in the 
Elmore case, there is a recognizable policy in Piercefield as to the status 
of the bystander under the rule of strict products liability: 
Take the recent case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 34 
... as an example of the reason for the rule. Would anyone, 
29 The Restatement of Torts Second §402A defines the basis of strict tort liability: 
"(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused 
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
"(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
"(b) it is expected to and does reach the consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold. 
"(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although 
"(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and 
"(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller." 
The applicability of cases tried under strict tort liability to cases arising under the 
antiprivity statute will be discussed infra. 
30 70 Cal. 2d578, 451 P.2d ey4, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, (1969). 
31 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 879, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
697 (1963) (user of defective lathe that threw off a piece of wood was allowed recovery in 
strict tort liability). 
32 70 Cal. 2d 578, 585-586, 451 P .2d 84, 88-89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656-657 ( 1969). 
33 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965). 
34 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 ( 1960). 
26
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/16
§13.18 TORTS 335 
having read the court's exhaustive opinion, expect a result reasoned 
differently had, say the plaintiff been a pedestrian who, when the 
Henningsen car [veered sharply to the right and crashed into a 
highway sign and a brick wall), suffered crushed legs as the car 
struck the wall? Take Spence35 as another example, and assume 
that the plaintiff there had been a bystander or visitor injured by a 
crumbling and buckling of some wall of the cottage which had been 
built of defective blocks. Would our result have been different? 
Take Hill v. Harbor Steel.36 Would we have denied recovery-on 
the same theory-to the personal representative of, say, a munic-
ipal inspector or buyer of scrap, then lawfully in the yard and 
killed by the same explosion?37 
The court in Piercefield implied that the bystander who is lawfully in 
the place where the injury occurs should be allowed to hold the de-
fendant strictly liable for his injuries. The cases cited by the court are 
only a few examples of the many varied situations in which bystander 
recovery might be allowed. 
In the recent case of Wasik v. Borg,38 the federal Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, in allowing bystander recovery of damages for 
personal injuries, applied the Section 2-318 provision of the Vermont 
Commercial Code in a rather unusual manner. The plaintiff bystander 
was injured when the car he was operating was struck from the rear by 
the defendant's automobile. The circuit court affirmed the verdict of 
the district court jury, which held the third-party defendant manu-
facturer of the car liable to the plaintiff for damages. The jury had 
found that the accident was due to a dangerous defect in the design or 
manufacture of the defendant's automobile, causing sudden accelera-
tion. The circuit court cited Vermont's adoption of Section 2-318, 
Alternative B,39 of the Uniform Commercial Code as authority for 
allowing bystander recovery, concluding that the code change paved 
the way for applying strict tort liability as it is articulated in Section 
402A of the Restatement of Torts Second. Alternative B applies only 
to recovery for personal injuries resulting from the breach of a seller's 
warranty, but it uses the same language of foreseeability as in the Mas-
sachusetts statute. The court in Wasik anticipated that in the future 
the Vermont courts would "look to the legislature's expansion of the 
35 Thecourt was referring to Spence v. Three Rivers Supply, 353 Mich. 120,90 N.W. 
2d 873 (1958). 
36 The court was referring to Hill v. Harbor Steel and Supply Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 
132 N.W.2d 54 (1965). 
37 375 Mich. 85, 99,133 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1965). 
38 423 F.2d 44 (2dCir. 1970). 
39 The official text of §2-318 reads as follows: "A seller's warranty whether express or 
implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or 
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, con-
sume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. 
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section." Alternative B omitted 
from the first sentence the words "who is in the family or household of his buyer or who 
is a guest in his home." 
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scope of protection under the alternative warranty theory as a guide"40 
by which they could apply strict products liability.41 
In evaluating the bystander's status in the products liability area, the 
cases mentioned above proceeded under the theory of strict tort liability. 
However, these cases should serve as useful guidelines in determining 
the classes of persons who should be allowed recovery under the war-
ranty approach of the code because, under both theories, the basic 
factor which limits recovery is the foreseeability of harm to the plain-
tiff or to his property. 
The new UCC §2-318 and the Restatement of Torts Second §402A 
establish a framework in which the defendant's negligence is eliminated 
as a condition to liability,42 although the Massachusetts commercial 
code provision retains negligence as an alternative basis for recovery. 
Under the warranty alternative, however, the defendant may have some 
defenses available which he might not otherwise have under a strict 
liability approach. One such difference is suggested in an official com-
ment to UCC §2-314.43 Furthermore, issues involving such matters 
as the effectiveness of disclaimers, the need to give notice of breach of 
warranty, or the determination of when the statute of limitations be-
gins to run might be resolved differently under strict tort liability than 
under the Uniform Commercial Code. It has already been noted that 
the concern over disclaimer clauses has been ameliorated by the addi-
tion of Section 2-316A to the Massachusetts commercial code. The de-
fense, under UCC §2-607(3)(a), that the plaintiff did not give notice of 
the breach may also be restricted since "it would appear that the notice 
requirement is limited to contracts for the sale of goods between plain-
tiff-buyer and defendant-seller. "44. 
Massachusetts courts will soon be hearing actions brought under 
the commercial code by plaintiffs who were not in privity with the de-
fendant at the time the alleged injury or loss was sustained. A choice 
will be open to the courts: to borrow tort principles, including strict 
liability, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did in Wasik, or to 
•o423F.2d44,49(2dCir.l970). 
41 Many writers have expressed the view that bystanders should be allowed to recover 
damages when injured by a defective product with which they have come in contact. See, 
e.g., Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 916 (1964); 
Comment, Cave Adstantem: Bystander Recovery in Products Liability Cases, 2 Creighton 
L. Rev. 295 (1968). In fact, it has been observed that Kentucky is the only jurisdiction 
that has adopted strict tort liability but has denied a bystander's right to recover. Com-
ment, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 635 (1971). 
42 See Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 Va. L. Rev. 804, 816(1965) [hereinafter cited as Speidel]. 
43 UCC §2-314, Comment 13 states that "evidence indicating that the seller exercised 
care in the manufacture, processing or selection of the goods is relevant to the issue of 
whether the warranty was in fact broken." However, under the Restatement of Torts 
Second§402A(2)(a), strict liability may be imposed even though "the seller has exercised 
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product." 
44 Speidel, n.42 supra, at 835. See also Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 26 Conn. Supp. 
219, 217 A.2d 71 (1965) (relieving the plaintiff, not a party to the sales contract, from the 
need to comply with the notice requirement). 
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develop and rationalize an expanded recovery for breach of warranty 
under the code. In making the choice, Massachusetts courts will prob-
ably consider the theory of recovery that other states have adopted 
under antiprivity legislation very similar to the Massachusetts statute. 
A decision that liability would be imposed under commercial law 
rather than under tort law came in the first case to construe the Virginia 
antiprivity statute. In Brockett v. Harrell Bros.,45 the plaintiff at-
tempted to hold the processor of impure ham liable for damages under 
an implied warranty of fitness. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia found it unneces~ary to decide whether to extend the common 
law tort principles of food-warranty protection; the legislature, in the 
court's view, had already assured such protection by passing the anti-
privity statute. In determining that contributory negligence was not a 
proper defense in an action for breach of an implied warranty of fitness, 
the court held that the action was ex contractu rather than one arising 
out of a tort. 46 Two recent Arkansas cases, Mack Trucks v. jet As-
phalt and Rock CoY and L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 48 have 
also followed a code-warranty approach. Both cases involved claims 
for a breach of implied warranties of quality. 
The Mack Truck case merits scrutiny. The Arkansas Supreme Court 
affirmed on appeal a judgment granting damages for the breach of an 
implied warranty of fitness against the defendants, the truck manufac-
turer and the truck dealer. The plaintiffs were lessees from the persons 
who had purchased defective diesel trucks from the original buyer, 
for whom the trucks had been specially manufactured. After the dealer 
had made several unsatisfactory repairs on the trucks, the plaintiffs 
purchased replacement parts elsewhere and won their claim for the 
expense incurred. The result is important because damages for econom-
ic loss were held to be within the scope of the antiprivity statute, in 
addition to damages for injuries to the person or to his property. Simi-
larly, a California decision, Seely v. White Motor Co., 49 has held that 
commercial losses are not recoverable under strict tort liability but are 
recoverable under the provisions of the California sales act or the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
One writer, citing the Brockett and Mack Truck decisions, has re-
marked that the Virginia and Arkansas statutes illustrate a legislative 
intent to make the commercial code "the exclusive source of liability 
in nonegligence products-liability cases."50 Another writer has 
evaluated Virginia's code provisions as follows: 
Virginia has virtually demolished the privity defense and has 
45 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965), construing Virginia Acts of 1962, c. 476, §8-654, 
which was repealed and replaced by Va. Code Ann. §8.2-318 (Supp. 1965). 
46 Id. at 463, 143 S.E.2d at 902. 
47 246Ark. 101,437 S.W.2d 459(1969). 
48 246Ark. 463,438 S.W.2d 717 (1969). 
49 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145,45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). 
50 Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 713, 766 (1970). 
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predicated the liability of manufacturers and sellers, in cases where 
negligence cannot be proved, upon "breach of warranty, express 
or implied." By this language and the positioning of the anti-
privity statute in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
General Assembly has clearly directed the courts to use the context 
and policy of the Sales article to determine the scope of and the 
conditions imposed upon strict products liability.51 
Maine's position on the matter is at present unclear because no case 
has yet applied its new commercial code provision abolishing privity. 
There has been a suggestion, however, that the Maine courts may pur-
sue the code-warranty approach.s2 
Now that the barrier of privity has been removed and the use of dis-
claimers restricted, if Massachusetts abandons the requirement of 
notice of breach of warranty for plaintiffs not in privity with the defen-
dant, a source of strict liability under the code would be created that 
may match or surpass that provided by Section 402A of the Restatement. 
For example, as noted above in connection with the Seely case, where 
damages for economic loss alone are sought, the code may be the sole 
source of recovery.53 If the Massachusetts code-warranty approach is 
construed to afford a plaintiff essentially the same protection as is 
offered under strict liability in tort, the label placed on the theory of 
recovery may have little significance.s4 
Conclusion. It is clear that a major change in the law of products 
liability has occurred in Massachusetts. No other state has coupled a 
broad antiprivity statute with another nonuniform provision as pro-
tective of consumers as code Section 2-316A. No longer will a plaintiff 
be denied recovery solely because of a privity requirement, and dis-
claimers of implied warranties will pose no threat to recovery when they 
arise in connection with consumer goods. Where commercial goods 
are involved, attempts to disclaim warranties as to remote purchasers 
or users will likewise be ineffective if such warranties were given to the 
immediate buyer. The requirement of notice of breach of warranty 
should apply only to the immediate buyer, since any other plaintiff 
would generally neither have dealings with the seller nor be aware of 
the technical notice requirement. Where reasonably foreseeable, com-
51 Speidel, n.42 supra, at 817. See also Leavell, The Legal Kaleidoscope-Products 
Liability, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 301, 320 (1967). 
52 See Note, Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plant, Inc.: Defective Products, Ex-
panded Liability, and the Demise of the Impact Rule, 23 Me. L. Rev. 227 (1971). 
53 In Seely, the California Supreme Court criticized an earlier New Jersey decision, 
Santor v. Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), which had held a manufacturer 
of defective carpeting liable on the basis of strict tort liability for the plaintiff buyer's 
economic loss. The Santor decision was criticized for having imposed liability without 
regard to the representations of quality made by the manufacturer. 63 Cal. 2d 17-18, 403 
P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965). 
54 Among the states that have imposed strict liability by statute, Prosser mentions 
Arkansas and Virginia. He refers in a footnote to their respective commercial code 
antiprivity provisions, but makes no reference to the theory of strict liability that the 
statutes embody. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 
50 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 796 (1966). 
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pensation should be allowed in products liability cases for personal 
injuries, property damage, and economic loss suffered by the plaintiff. 
The classes of foreseeable plaintiffs under code Section 2-318 are yet 
to be determined. However, case law in jurisdictions that have adopted 
a strict products liability theory suggests that the protected class is 
broad and may include subpurchasers, users, consumers, passengers, 
bailees, lessees, employees, bystanders, and even rescuers. 
JOSEPH S. SMITH 
§13.19. Bailment: Parking facility owners and their customers: 
Hale v. Massachusetts Parking Aiithority. 1 The plaintiff was a 
daily patron of the defendant's parking garage, for which privilege he 
made monthly payments. His status as a daily patron was signified by 
a special decal on the window of his new Jaguar and by a parker's plate 
that he displayed to an attendant each time he left the garage. In addi-
tion, each time he entered the garage, he was given a ticket. On Novem-
ber ll, 1964, he left his car in the section assigned to him, locked it, and 
took the keys with him. On the evening of November 13, someone 
appeared at the garage exit driving the plaintiff's car. Noticing the 
special decal on the window of the car, the attendant asked the driver to 
present his ticket and parker's plate. The driver said he didn't have 
them. The attendant then directed the driver to pull his vehicle over to 
one side of the exit lane while he summoned the night manager. There 
were no devices at the exit to prevent drivers of cars from leaving the 
garage at will, and before the manager arrived, the person in the plain-
tiff's car sped away. Neither the manager nor the attendant took further 
action at that time, the former surmising that the driver was probably 
the owner. Four hours later, the plaintiff came to the garage to get his 
car but found it missing. He informed the night manager, who imme-
diately contacted the police. The automobile was never recovered. 
Mr. Hale brought an action in tort and contract in the Superior 
Court of Suffolk County to recover the value of the car. At trial, it was 
conceded that the defendant had been a bailee of the plaintiff's car at 
the time it was stolen,2 and the judge gave the following instructions 
to the jury at the plaintiff's request: 
As to motor vehicles left in the care of a garage keeper, he is a bailee 
for hire and as such is liable for any loss or damage to the property 
resulting from his negligence or that of his servants .... With 
reference to such property, he is bound to exercise that degree of 
care which may reasonably be expected from ordinarily prudent 
persons under similar circumstances. 3 
When the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant filed a 
§13.19. 1 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.I629,265N.E.2d494. 
2 Brieffor Plaintiff at 7, Hale v. Mass. Parking Authority. 
3 I d. at3 (citations omitted). 
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motion for judgment under leave reserved. The court granted the mo-
tion, directing a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted, ar-
guing that since reasonable men could reach different conclusions as 
to whether the evidence warranted a finding of negligence, the case 
was properly submitted to the jury and the jury's verdict must stand. 
The Supreme Judicial Court set aside the verdict for the defendant and 
held that on the evidence presented, a jury could have found the de-
fendant negligent. 
Hale illustrates the approach that courts in this country have uni-
formly adopted in dealing with actions against commercial parking 
lot or garage operators for the loss of or damage to their patrons' 
vehicles.4 Whether the operator of the parking facility owes the patron 
a duty of care sufficient to sustain the action has usually depended upon 
whether the relationship between them can properly be characterized 
as one of bailment.5 It is generally agreed that a bailee's duty in this 
relationship is to "exercise ordinary or reasonable care to preserve and 
return the car to the owner,"6 although he is not an insurer of the 
vehicle.7 After establishing a bailment, the plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant was negligent in performing his duty. In actions where 
a bailment is not found, the relationship is generally deemed to be one 
of licensor-licensee.8 According to this rationale, the operator-licensor 
merely rents the space for parking and has only the duty to refrain from 
willful or wanton injury to the licensee or his property.9 The burden 
of proving willful or wanton conduct has the practical effect of barring 
recovery if the plaintiff is merely a licensee. 1o 
Similar in its broad outline to numerous other cases, Hale does not 
represent a departure from existing law, but the case exemplifies the 
4 See generally 38 Am. Jur. 2d Garages §§27-41 (1968); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 927 (1966); 
9 Williston, Contracts §1065 (3d ed. 1967). Except where a specific distinction is made, 
the terms garage and parking lot will be used interchangeably. 
5 The law has traditionally distinguished different kinds of bailments. See, e.g., 
Story, Bailments c. I, §§3-8 (9th ed. 1878). In this discussion, as in parking cases gen-
erally, bailment means "bailment for hire." See 9 Williston, Contracts §1065 (3d ed. 1967). 
6 Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d927, 935(1966). 
7 See, e.g., Hanna v. Shaw,244Mass. 57, 59, 138 N.E. 247, 248(1923). 
8 Silberman v. Olympic Parking Service, 60 Misc. 2d. 68, 302 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Civ. Ct. 
1969); Weinberg v. Wayco Petroleum Co., 402 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966). A few 
courts have found a lessor-lessee relationship. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pond, 143 
N.E.2d 189 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1957). A few cases distinguish between the license and lease 
relationships. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ebersole, 244 Ala. 200, 204, 12 So. 2d 543, 544 (1943). 
The- important point, however, is that both license and lease theories usually operate to 
prevent recovery. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 927, 937-938 (1966). 
9 Prosser, The Law of Torts §60 (4th ed. 1971). For a statement of the rule in Massachu-
setts, see Siver v. Atlantic Union College, 338 Mass. 212, 216, !54 N.E.2d 360, 363 (1959). 
But cf. Simons v. Murray Realty: Inc., 330 Mass. 194, 196-197, 112 N.E.2d 264, 266 (1953), 
which suggests that a license for hire relationship might exact a greater duty of care 
than a bailment. 
10 Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 927, 937-938 (1966). Beyond the general denial of recovery, there 
is little analysis of the precise legal consequences of the license (or lease) relationship in 
the parking cases, first, because virtually all actions are predicated on a negligence 
theory, so that a finding of no bailment effectively ends the discussion; and second, be-
cause there are many more cases holding bailment than not. Id. at 931-932. 
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continuing failure of the Supreme Judicial Court to articulate the 
factual criteria that will establish a bailment for hire of a parked auto-
mobile.11 This lack of clarification is remarkable when one considers 
that the existence of a bailment is apparently the sine qua non for 
recovery in parking cases. The full extent of the Court's discussion in 
Hale was the brief statement: "The Superior Court correctly instructed 
the jury that the defendant was a bailee for hire." 
Of course, the broad outlines of an ordinary bailment have long been 
settled in Massachusetts12 and elsewhere. Essentially, a bailment is a 
delivery of property in trust by one party to another for a specific pur-
pose, with an agreement, express or implied, that upon the accomplish-
ment of that purpose, the property will be returned to the original 
party.13 The general guidelines have been state~ thusly: 
It is well settled that the relationship of bailor and bailee does not 
exist unless there is such a delivery of the property that the alleged 
bailee acquires an independent and temporarily exclusive posses-
sion thereof, and unless there is an actual change of legal as well 
as physical possession of the property from the bailor to the 
bailee .... 14 
There must, of course, be an acceptance of the goods forming the sub-
ject matter of the bailment before a bailor-bailee relationship is formed. 
Acceptance may be expressed or implied from the transaction. 15 
Whether a transfer of possession creates a bailment depends upon 
whether the prospective bailee has assumed control over the vehicle. 16 
On the precise degree of control necessary to establish a bailment and 
the factors material to that determination, jurisdictions differ widely, 
and it is on those issues that Massachusetts courts have been silent. 
Some courts apply the "temporary and exclusive possession'~ test strictly, 
requiring that the parking facility have nearly as much control over 
the vehicle as its owner ordinarily has and that the management retain 
the keys and have the right to move the carP In other jurisdictions, 
11 The Supreme Judicial Court has had many opportunities to elaborate a theory of 
bailment in automobile cases; see, e.g., King v. Motor Mart Garage Co. 336 Mass. 422, 
146 N.E.2d 365 (1957); Soutier v. Kaplow, 330 Mass. 448, ll5 N.E.2d 149 (1953); Butler 
v. Bowdoin Square Garage, Inc. 329 Mass. 28, 105 N.E.2d 838 (1952); Stevens v. St. 
Botolph Holding Co., 316 Mass. 238, 55 N.E.2d 450 (1944); Sandler v. Commonwealth 
Station Co., 307 Mass. 470, 30 N.E.2d 389 (1940); Doherty v. Ernst, 284 Mass. 341, 187 
N.E. 620 (1933); Rourke v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 268 Mass. 7, 167 N.E. 231 (1929). 
12 See, e.g., D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. North Terminal Garage Co., 291 Mass. 251, 256-
258, 197 N.E. 16, 19-20 (1935). 
13 Black's Law Dictionary 179(4th ed.l968). 
14 Southeastern Fair Assn. v. Ford, 64 Ga. App. 871, 872, 14 S.E.2d 139, 140 (1941). 
Legal possession in this context means a possession that will support an action by the 
bailee against one who interferes with his possession or negligently destroys the bailed 
property. 
15 8Am. Jur. 2dBailments§60 (1963). 
16 Id. §54; 9Williston, Contracts§l065 n.l (3ded. 1967). 
17 Weinberg v. Wayco Petroleum Co., 402 S.W.2d 597, 599-600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pond, 143 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1957); Lee Tire and Rubber 
Co. v. Dormer, 48 Del. 578,583, 108 A.2d 168, 170-171 (1954). 
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the requirements of control are met if the vehicle is within the premises 
of the parking facility and the management is thus theoretically able 
to protect it from third parties. 18 The issuance of parking checks~ 
an important element of control in many cases, has been particularly 
important where the driver had to present his ticket before he could 
reclaim his car. According to this view, the parking facility has control 
even as against the true owner until he produces his claim ticket. 
Under a different approach to the issue of control, some courts 
have looked to all of the circumstances of the parking operation in 
order to determine whether its operator could reasonably be expected 
to prevent harm to or theft of the car. If he can safeguard the vehicles 
entrusted to him, he is considered to have that quantum of control 
sufficient to be a bailee. Material to this determination are such factors 
as the number of exits and attendants, the structure of the facility, and 
the ability of attendants to observe cars and persons in the lot. 19 Going 
beyond this approach, some courts will impute control where the 
alleged bailee has derived some benefit from the transaction other than 
a parking fee. 20 Of course, there are variations to each approach, and 
the weight given to the relevant factors differs from case to case, but 
jurisdictions generally agree that control is the determinative factor. 
The first parking lot case in Massachusetts was Doherty v. Ernst, 21 
in which the attendant of a small outdoor parking lot watched som~­
one drive over the curbing in the plaintiff's car and did nothing to stop 
the apparent theft. The Supreme Judicial Court had no difficulty in af-
firming the trial court's finding of bailment, citing three earlier Massa-
chusetts cases that had involved the bailment of autos elsewhere than 
in parking lots.22 However, the Court did not consider or even acknow-
ledge the factual differences between the earlier cases and the facts in 
Doherty. The Court ineffectively distinguished three cases from other 
jurisdictions23 and failed to discuss the degree of control it considered 
necessary for a bailment. 
Since Doherty, many garage or parking lot cases have come before 
the Supreme Judicial Court,24 but in none of them has the existence 
of a bailment been the principal issue on appeal. This fact may help 
18 Scruggs v. Dennis, 222 Tenn. 714, 440 S.W.2d 20 (1969). See also Continental 
Ins. Co. v. Meyers Bros. Operations, 56 Misc. 2d 435, 438, 288 N.Y.S.2d 756, 760 (Civ. Ct. 
1968). 
19 Ex parte Mobile Light and R. Co., 211 Ala. 525,527, 101 So. 177, 178 (1924). This 
view seems to confuse the control criteria of a bailment with the considerations that 
should go toward determining the standard of care that is reasonable to impose once a 
bailment has been established. 
2o Klotzv. EIMoroccolntl., Ltd., 56 Misc. 2d319,288N.Y.S.2d684(Civ. Ct.1967). 
2t 284 Mass. 341, 187 N.E. 620(1933). 
22 Guttentag v. Huntley, 245 Mass. 212, 139 N.E. 501 (1923); Hanna v. Shaw, 244 
Mass. 57, 138 N.E. 247 (1923); Hayes v. Maykel Auto. Co., 234 Mass. 198, 125 N.E. 165 
(1919). 
23 Ex parte Mobile Light and R. Co., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924); Lord v. Okla-
homa State Fair Assn., 95 Okla. 294, 219 P. 713 (1923); Suits v. Electric Park Amusement 
Co., 213 Mo. App. 275, 249 S.W. 656 (1923). 
24 See n.ll supra. 
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explain the sketchy treatment heretofore given the bailment question, 
but the history of the earliest bailed vehicle cases seems to be even more 
pivotal. The earliest cases involved cars left at garages for repairs.25 
The nature of a contract for automobile repairs necessitates that the 
garage keeper take custody of the vehicle, and it was natural for the 
Supreme Judicial Court to declare such transactions bailments after 
only cursory analysis. Furthermore, because there was no well-developed 
law regarding automobile garages in the early part of this century, the 
Court seems to have derived its approach from the law governing livery-
men and warehousemen, who were ordinarily considered bailees of 
the property that they handled.26 Another group of early bailed ve-
hicle cases in Massachusetts involved contracts for "live storage,"27 
which were similar to the agreement that Mr. Hale had with the Mas-
sachusetts Parking Authority. Under this type of contract, a motorist 
rented space in a garage for an extended period of time during which 
the car was available for use at his convenience. Unlike the contract in 
Hale, however, these were usually not impersonal transactions. Neither 
garages nor automobiles were as plentiful as they are today, and the 
live storage contract was a person-to-person transaction, sometimes 
negotiated. Thus, when Doherty was decided in 1933, a number of 
Massachusetts cases had already found bailments in circumstances 
where automobiles had been left in the care of a garage owner. The 
Supreme Judicial Court used the cases as authority for the bailment 
holding in Doherty, even though Doherty presented different facts. 
At the time, it may not have seemed necessary to justify or explain the 
bailment holding beyond citing the older cases; but it seems that inHale 
and other recent cases, findings of bailment have been based more on 
the impetus of Doherty than on an evaluation of present-day condi-
tions. Today we have transactions between motorists and huge parking 
facilities on a very impersonal basis, creating situations quite different 
from the early repair and storage cases. 
Unlike the Supreme Judicial Court, some of the lower Massachusetts 
courts have drawn distinctions in parking cases between the licensor-
licensee relationship and the bailor-bailee relationship, with the critical 
consideration predictably being the degree of control exercised by the 
operator of the parking lot or garage. Two lower court cases involved 
motel parking lots where the parking was free, drivers could come and 
go at will, and attendants were not always on duty.28 It was held in 
those cases that the motels merely licensed the use of parking space to 
their guests. These two cases are not necessarily inconsistent with the 
25 Rourke v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 268 Mass. 7, 167 N.E. 231 (1929); Rogers v. Murch, 
253 Mass. 467, 149 N.E. 202 (1925); Doyle v. Peerless Motorcar Co., 226 Mass. 561, 116 
N.E. 257 (1917); Stevens v. Stewart-Warner Speedometer Corp., 223 Mass. 44, 111 N.E. 
71 (1916). 
26 See, e.g., Hanna v. Shaw, 244 Mass. 57, 59, 138 N.E. 247,248 (1923). 
27 Georgalis v. Geas, 265 Mass. 8, 163 N.E. 170 (1928); Feins v. Ralby, 245 Mass. 228, 
139 N.E. 530 (1923); Hayes v. Maykel Auto. Co., 234 Mass. 198, 125 N.E. 165 (1919). 
28 Miller v. Commonwealth Motor Hotel, 40 Mass. App. Dec. 49 (1968); Gibson v. 
Hotel Corp. of America, 36 Mass. App. Dec. 70 (1966). 
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Supreme Judicial Court opinions finding bailment, since no cases in-
volving so slight a degree of control by the parking facility have come 
before the Supreme Judicial Court.29 Findings of license in two other 
lower court cases, Hall v. Lyndon30 and Ravisini v. Auditorium,31 are 
not so easy to rationalize. In each instance, the driver had entered a 
parking facility, paid a fee, received a check, and retained his keys. It 
is difficult to distinguish the facts in these two lower court cases, upon 
which a license was found, from some Supreme Judicial Court cases 
in which a bailment was found.32 The Hall opinion, rendered by the 
Appellate Division of the Boston Municipal Court, recognized the 
bailment holding in Doherty but attempted to distinguish it: "The evi-
dence in the instant case does not permit of a finding that the defendant 
ever acquired an independent and temporarily exclusive posse&,sion of 
the plaintiff's automobile which is an essential element of a bailment. "33 
Although the test of temporary and exclusive possession is common in 
other jurisdictions, there is no precedent for it in Massachusetts park-
ing cases. Unfortunately, the Hall opinion failed to discuss what was 
meant by temporary and exclusive possession, and no attempt was made 
to distinguish or discuss Doherty and other cases in which a bailment 
had been found. The most important factor in Hall and Ravisini ap-
pears to have been, the driver's retention of the keys. Nonetheless, as 
Judge Lewiton pointed out in his concurring opinion in Ravisini,34 
the Supreme Judicial Court has twice found bailments where the 
driver retained his keys.35 
Since the decision in Hale, there may have been a change in the ap-
proach of the lower courts to the bailment question. The same judge 
who found a license relationship in Ravisini two years ago recently 
found bailments in two cases factually similar to both Ravisini and 
Hall.36 Although he did not distinguish his earlier decision, Judge 
Adlow reasoned that retention of the keys by the driver did not neces-
sarily indicate that the garage lacked control of the vehicle; he cited 
Hale and other Massachusetts cases in which a bailment had been 
29 But d. the New York case of Klotz v. El Morocco Inti., Ltd., 56 Misc. 2d 319, 288 
N.Y.S.2d 684 (Civ. Ct. 1967). 
50 6Mass. App. Dec. I (1953)., 
51 42Mass.App. Dec. 89(1969). 
32 See King v. Motor Mart Garage Co., 336 Mass. 422, 146 N.E.2d 365 (1957); Green-
berg v. Shoppers' Garage, 329 Mass. 30, 105 N.E.2d 839 (1952) . 
• 53 6Mass.App. Dec. I, 4(1953). 
3442 Mass. App. Dec. 89, 93 (1969). The decision in Ravisini turned on a disclaimer 
clause printed on the parking check. Judge Lewiton concurred in the result on that 
basis but disagreed that the relationship in the case was one of license rather than bail-
ment. 
55 Greenberg v. Shoppers' Garage, 329 Mass. 30, 105 N.E.2d 839 (1952); D. A. Schulte, 
Inc. v. North Terminal Garage, Inc., 291 Mass. 251, 197 N.E. 16 (1935). Although there-
ports of these cases do not mention keys, it should be pointed out that Judge Lewiton sat 
in the trial court that heard Greenberg. His source for Schulte information is not so clear, 
although the facts in that case suggest that the plaintiff held the keys. 
56 ForbroofNew York, Inc. v. Hotel Somerset, No. 203268 (Boston Mun. Ct., App. Div., 
June 15, 1971); Richard v. Massachusetts Port Authority, No. T-22979 (Boston Mun. Ct., 
App. Div., June 10, 1971). 
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found even though the drivers had retained their keys. Unfortunately, 
until the Supreme Judicial Court discusses the bailment issue, lower 
courts will differ as to the criteria that should be applied in parking 
cases. 
In evaluating the many factors that may be relevant to the question 
of bailment, it is submitted that the courts or the legislature should be-
gin by realizing that the law of bailment was not fashioned to deal 
with today's parking lot cases.37 When adopted in the earliest parking 
lot cases, it was already a fully developed area of the law, with legal 
requirements and consequences that had come into being without re-
gard to the interests of the parties in parking cases. Undoubtedly, its 
adoption was originally intended to distribute equitably the risks in-
volved in commercial parking transactions. If the theory of bailment 
is to be defended today as suitable for governing actions based on park-
ing transactions, its justification must lie in its adaptability as a method 
for producing a fair distribution of the risks. No longer should it be 
necessary to apply a test of temporary and exclusive possession; the 
parking lot operator should not be required to have the same degree of 
control over the vehicle that its owner normally has. To qualify as a 
bailee, the lot or garage owner needs only enough control to be able to 
ensure that the vehicle will not be treated in a manner other than is 
ordinarily contemplated in a parking transaction. His ability to exer-
cise that control should be assessed according to the circumstances 
of his particular parking operation. 
Some courts will not look beyond the fact of who retains the keys, 
reasoning that if the lot owner does not have the keys, he cannot be 
considered to have control of the car.38 In fact, however, possession of 
the keys by one party or the other often has little to do with the poten-
tial risks involved in a parking operation. Garage owners who hold 
drivers' keys usually do so, not to prevent theft or damage, but to be 
able to move cars in the interest of maximum efficiency. A garage owner 
cannot deter a professional car thief simply by keeping the driver's 
keys, for the thief either has his own keys or needs none. As one judge 
commented in a recent decision, "In a world abounding with car 
thieves, locks and keys have only a symbolic significance."39 None-
theless, in Lee Tire and Rubber Co. v. Dormer,40 a Delaware court 
ruled that a parking transaction was not a bailment because the auto-
mobile owner had kept his keys. It was the owner's usual practice to 
leave a set of keys with the management of the facility. On those 
37 See Jones, The Parking Lot Cases, 27 Geo. L.J. 162 (1938), where the author com-
plained that the use of the law of bailment in parking cases was an example of trying "to 
apply settled principles of law to a new problem." Even in 1938, rapid and sweeping 
social changes were showing up the deficiencies of the bailment approach in parking 
cases. 
38 Coleman v. Chicago Thoroughbred Enterprises, Inc., 102 Ill. App. 2d 400, 243 N.E. 
2d 333,336 (1968), and cases in n.l7 supra. 
39 Richard v. Massachusetts Port Authority, No. T-22979 (Boston Mun. Ct., App. Div., 
June 10, 1971). 
40 48 Del. 578, 108A.2d 168 ( 1954). 
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occasions, the court said, his relationship with the management was 
one of bailment, but on occasions when the keys were not handed 
over, the control on the part of the management was deemed insuffi-
cient to create a bailment. The court did not consider whether the 
plaintiff's retention of the keys actually affected the defendant's ability 
to store the car in a safe, convenient place. A more sensible application 
of the keys-control formula can be found in Schwartz v. Miller and 
Seddon Co.,41 in which the plaintiff left his car at a garage for re-
pairs but inadvertently kept his key. Because the defendants were un-
able to move his car into the garage for the night, they were held not 
liable for the loss of the car. Failure to leave the keys frustrated the 
purpose of the transaction and thus provided a reasonable basis for a 
decision precluding bailment. 
New York courts have shown a willingness to adapt the law of bail-
ment to achieve a distribution of the risks in parking transactions. A 
case in point is Klotz v. El Morocco Intl., Ltd.,42 which involved a 
nightclub that did not issue parking checks or charge a parking fee. 
Attendants employed by the club apparently parked the cars on the 
street wherever spacepermitted, and the plaintiff's car was stolen after 
an attendant had parked it around the corner from the nightclub. Even 
though the plaintiff had paid no parking fee, the New York court 
found that the owners of the club owed the plaintiff a duty of ordinary 
care, on the ground that they had instituted the parking service as a 
means to attract patrons and had accepted the benefit of the plaintiff's 
patronage. In another recent New York decision, as to the issue of 
whether a delivery of possession sufficient to impose liability on the 
defendant had taken place, it was determined that this depended upon 
the intent of the parties, drawn from the particular circumstances of 
the case, namely, the place, conditions, and nature of the parking 
transaction. 43 
Another problem area in parking cases involves the use of disclaimers 
of liability, which are usually printed on the back of parking checks 
or posted on signs in parking garages. When disclaimers are given 
full effect, the standard of care that should be required of one who 
makes money by hiring parking space to others is brushed aside. For-
tunately, the general trend is to give only limited effect to disclaimers.44 
New York has gone so far as to void them by statute in parking trans-
actions.45 Some state courts have held them void in parking cases as 
'
41 27Mass.App.Dec.l76(1964). 
42 56 Misc. 2d319,288N.Y.S.2d684(Civ. Ct.l967). 
13 Palazzo v. Katz Parking Systems, Inc., 64 Misc. 2d 720, 315 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Civ. Ct. 
1970). For an example of an tntelligent weighing of factors in terms of the intent of the 
parties, see 1420 Park Rd. Parking, Inc. v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 168 A.2d 900 
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1961) (Hood, J., dissenting). 
44 Prosser, The LawofTorts§68, at442-444 (4th ed. 1971). 
45 "No person who conducts or maintains for hire or other consideration a garage, 
parking lot or other similar place which has the capacity for the . . . parking . . . of 
four or more vehicles . . . may exempt himself from liability for damages for injury to 
person or property resulting from the negligence of such person, his agents or employ-
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against public policy46 or have held that disclaimers are unilateral 
and therefore of no effect if not read by the motoristY 
Unfortunately, in Massachusetts it has been held that a disclaimer 
of liability on a parking check effectively insulates the operator of the 
parking facility from liability for his own or his servants' negligence, 
whether or not the disclaimer is read by the motorist. 48 The only ex-
ception to this harsh rule came in a case where the motorist did not 
read the disclaimer and could reasonably have taken it to be merely a 
receipt for his car. The Supreme Judicial Court decided that a reason-
able man could have assumed that the operator of the garage would 
take responsibility for the car.49 
If rules governing liability in parking cases are to be based on a fair 
distribution of duty and risk, disclaimers of any kind frustrate that goal 
and should be disallowed or carefully limited. The chief argument in 
their favor is that parties to a transaction should be free to negotiate 
terms between themselves. Modern experience shows that this argument 
is often specious. In many contemporary urban situations, a motorist 
is forced to park his car in a commercial garage or lot. Such a motorist, 
according to one court, is a "captive customer."50 A motorist inten-
ding to fly out of Logan Airport may have no choice but to leave his 
car in the Massachusetts Port Authority garage. Similarly, a city 
dweller who does not have access to a private garage, and who wishes 
to protect his car from inclement weather and the wear and tear of on-
street parking, has little choice but to park his automobile in rented 
space in a public garage. It is not difficult for thieves to determine that 
cars are unattended or poorly attended in these situations. It is pos-
sible, perhaps, that there is collusion between attendants and thieves 
in some cases. In Richard v. Massachusetts Port Authority, testimony 
was received that over a period of several weeks, an average of 20 
vehicles per week were stolen from the defendant's multilevel garage. 51 
That statistic is appalling, and it becomes more so when, by disclaim-
ing liability, a parking facility can place the loss entirely on the mo-
ees ... and any agreement so exempting such person shall be void." N.Y. Gen. Oblig. 
Law §5·325 (McKinney 1963). 
46 Parkrite Auto Park, Inc. v. Badgett, 242 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); Atkin Rac-
quet Garage Corp., 177 Pa. Super. 94, 110 A.2d 767 (1955); Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Assn. 
v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341 (1951); Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 64 A.2d 
51 (1949); Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N.E.2d 658 (1944); 
Cascade Auto Co. v. Petter, 72 Colo. 570, 212 P. 823 (1923); Weinberger v. Werremeyer, 
224 Ill. App. 217 (1922). 
47 Parking Management, Inc. v. Jacobson, 257 A.2d 479 (D.C. 1969); Savoy Hotel 
Corp. v. Sparks, 57 Tenn. App. 537, 421, S.W.2d 98 (1967). 
••Sandler v. Commonwealth Station Co., 307 Mass. 470, 30 N.E.2d 389 (1940); cf. 
King v. Motor Mart Garage Co., 336 Mass. 442, 146 N.E.2d 365 (1957); O'Fiaherty v. 
Cunard Steamship Co., 281 Mass. 447, 183 N.E. 712 (1933). 
49 Sandler v. Commonwealth Station Co., 307 Mass. 470, 30 N.E.2d 389 (1940). See 
also Kergald v. Armstrong Transfer Co., 339 Mass. 254, 113 N.E.2d 53 (1953). 
so Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meyers Bros. Operations, 84 Misc. 2d 648, 649, 315 N.Y.S.2d 
196, 198 (Cir. Ct. 1970). 
51 No. T-22979, at 5 (Boston Mun. Ct., App. Div., June 10, 1971). 
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torist. The Massachusetts policy toward disclaimers should be changed, 
preferably by legislative action such as that taken in New York.52 
Undoubtedly, it is difficult in many cases for garages to prevent 
theft of or damage to their patrons' vehicles. Eliminating disclaimers 
may entail significant expenses to lot owners for additional insurance, 
manpower, and procedures. The cost of parking would probably rise 
in consequence. However, it is worth pointing out in this regard that 
in New York, where the standard of care demanded of parking entre-
preneurs has been particularly strict in recent years, the parking indus-
try has nevertheless flourished. 
RICHARD W. LARKIN 
§13.20. Intentional infliction of severe mental distress with conse-
quential physical injury: Recognition of an independent tort: George 
v. Jordan Marsh Co.1 The plaintiff's emancipated son purchased 
goods on credit from the defendant Jordan Marsh Company.2 Subse-
quently, plaintiff alleged, Jordan Marsh, although aware that the plain-
tiff had in no way guaranteed to pay her son's debt, attempted to collect 
the debt from her. Mrs. George alleged that in its attempt to collect the 
debt for which she disclaimed liability, defendant, with intent to cause 
her great mental distress, "badgered and harassed" her by telephoning 
her many times late in the evening, by mailing her bills marked "account 
referred to law and collection department," and by threatening to re-
voke, and actually revoking, her credit at the Jordan Marsh Company. 
Plaintiff, after allegedly. suffering great mental anguish, deterioration 
of health, and a heart attack as a result of defendant's actions, retained 
an attorney. Plaintiff's counsel advised the defendant to cease its ha-
rassing tactics immediately because Mrs. George did not owe the debt 
in question and because her health was being adversely affected by the 
collection tactics. Mrs. George claimed that the defendant nonetheless 
continued to employ the same collection tactics, and that, as a result, 
she suffered a second heart attack. 
At trial in superior court, defendant's demurrer was sustained. The 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed and remanded the case for trial on the 
merits, declaring that 
one Who without a privilege to do so, by extreme and outrageous 
conduct intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another, 
with bodily harm resulting from such distress, is subject to liability 
52 In New York, even before the antidisclaimer statute was enacted, some courts had 
invalidated attempts at disclaimer as against public policy. 
§13.20. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.563,268N.E.2d915. 
2 Plaintiff named three defendants in her complaint: Jordan Marsh Company and two 
individuals who, plaintiff alleged, represented themselves to her as employees of Jordan 
Marsh. Since the plaintiff made the same allegations against each of the named defen-
dants, the word defendant will be used in this casenote to refer to all three named defen-
dants. 
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for such emotional distress and bodily harm even though he has 
committed no heretofore recognized common law tort.3 
To understand the step taken by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
George, one must consider the prior rule that had existed in Massachu-
setts since the Court's 1897 decision in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R.4 
In that case the plaintiff, a passenger on the defendant's train, alleged 
great mental distress and consequential bodily injury as a result of an 
altercation, in her immediate presence, between the defendant's con-
ductor and two intoxicated passengers. There was, however, no physical 
impact to her person contemporaneous with the altercation, and the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that 
there can be no recovery for fright, terror, alarm, anxiety, or dis-
tress of mind, if these are unaccompanied by some physical injury; 
and if this rule is to stand, we think it should also be held that 
there can be no recovery for such physical injuries as may be 
caused solely by such mental disturbance, where there is no injury 
to the person from without.5 
In the George decision, the Supreme Judicial Court asserted that the 
Spade rule does not apply to cases involving intentionally inflicted 
mental distress. Except for eight cases cited in a footnote,6 the Court 
did not rely on decisions from other jurisdictions, choosing instead to 
draw heavily on the writings of legal scholars as authority for its 
decision. 7 
Many jurisdictions have for years recognized intentional infliction 
of severe mental distress as an independent cause of action;8 but until 
this "new tort"9 was recognized in Massachusetts, 10 plaintiffs and the 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 563, 573, 268 N.E.2d 915, 921. The Court also pointed out that 
there might be a possible remedy under Acts of 1970, c. 883, §1, amending G.L., c. 93, 
§49 (pertaining to unfair, deceptive, or unreasonable collection procedures). The plain-
tiff in the George case did not raise a claim under the statute. 
'168Mass.285,47N.E.88(1897). 
s Id. at290, 47 N.E. at 89. 
6 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 70 App. D.C. 183, 105 F.2d 62 (1939); Duty v. 
General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 
210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 
N.W. 424 (1934); Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); 
Maze v. Employees' Loan Soc., 217 Ala. 44, 114 So. 574 (1927); Delta Finance Co. v. Gan-
akas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956); Herman Saks and Sons v. Ivey, 26 Ala. App. 
240, 157 So. 265 (1934), cited in 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 563,570 n.6, 268 N.E.2d 915, 919 n.6. 
7 Restatement of Torts Second §46; Prosser, The Law of Torts §II (3d ed. 1964); Har-
per and James, Torts §9.1 (1956); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the 
Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936). 
8 See cases cited in treatises and article, n. 7 supra. 
9 Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 
874 (1939). 
10 It should be noted that in an opinion rendered in 1959, the federal District Court 
for Massachusetts suggested that the Supreme Judicial Court, if faced with the issue, 
would allow recovery for an intentional infliction of severe mental distress even without 
consequential bodily injury. Cohen v. Lion Products Co., 177 F. Supp. 486 (D. Mass. 
1959). 
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courts often struggled to find a recognized tort to which a claim for 
severe mental distress and resultant bodily injury could be attached. 11 
In rejecting Jordan Marsh's contention that there should be no recovery 
because a precedent did not exist in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court said: 
It would indeed be unfortunate, and perhaps disastrous, if we were 
required to conclude that at some unknown point in the dim and 
distant past the law solidified in a manner and to an extent which 
makes it impossible now to answer a question which had not 
arisen and been answered prior to that point. The courts must, 
and do, have the continuing power and competence to answer 
novel questions of law arising under ever changing conditions of 
the society which the law is intended to serve. 12 
Although the new cause of action is obviously not limited to the debtor-
creditor confrontation, it is likely to arise frequently in situations 
similar to that in George. 13 Therefore, while this casenote will con-
sider the general dimensions of the new cause of action, its effects on 
the debtor-creditor relationship will be emphasized. 
Although George is unquestionably a significant decision, it is also 
arguably a very narrow one. First of all, the Supreme Judicial Court 
made it clear that it was not overruling its Spade decision. 14 More 
importantly, the Court limited its discussion to cases of intentional 
infliction of severe mental distress with consequential bodily injury, 
brought about by extreme and outrageous conduct. The first limitation 
established by the Court is that severe mental distress must be inten-
tionally inflicted. The George decision does not reveal how the word 
intentionally is to be defined; for the purposes of the demurrer, the 
defendant had already admitted intent to cause severe mental distress. 
11 Although Massachusetts has long allowed recovery of damages for mental dis-
tress, the awards were always made as parasitic damages. See, e.g., Frewen v. Page, 238 
Mass. 499, 131 N.E. 475 (1921); Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, 233 Mass. 174, 
123 N.E. 615 (1919); Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580 (1878). 
12 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 563,568,268 N.E.2d915, 918. 
1! In other jurisdictions, the first cases in which recognition was given to a cause of 
action for intentional infliction of mental distress have often been collection cases. See, 
e.g., Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954); Barnett v. Collection 
Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932). Such cases present the courts with com-
plete documentary evidence of the alleged wrong. 
• 14 Although Spade has been much criticized (see, e.g., Brody, Negligently Inflicted 
Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 232 (1961) ), the Supreme Judicial 
Court specifically declined to overrule it. However, the Court noted that it was not ruling 
on the legal sufficiency of "allegations of negligent, grossly negligent, wanton or reck-
less conduct"; and the opinion indicates a possible willingne·ss to reconsider Spade. To 
the same conclusion, see Stashio, George v. Jordan Marsh Co., Middlesex B.Q. (Aug. 
1971). Changes in the neighboring jurisdictions of New York and Maine, where decisions 
very similar to Spade have been overruled, may also put pressure on the Supreme Judi-
cial Court to reconsider Spade. See Baualla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 
219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), overruling Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 
(1896); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970), overruling 
Herrick v. Evening Express Pub!. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921). 
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A look at other jurisdictions, however, suggests that the word inten-
tionally may be interpreted in several ways. A very narrow interpreta-
tion would require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant actually 
acted with the specific intent to cause the plaintiff severe mental dis-
tress. Although there are cases in which such an intent is virtually self-
evident,15 such a narrow interpretation would tend to limit recovery. 
A broader interpretation of intentionally would include instances where 
the defendant did not actually intend to cause severe mental distress, 
but should have realized that his acts could reasonably be expected to 
cause such distress. In Savage v. Boies, 16 for example, the defendant, 
a police officer, attempted to lure the plaintiff to a hospital for psychi-
atric tests by telling her that her husband and child had been involved 
in an automobile accident. The plaintiff, believing the officer's story, 
suffered extreme mental anguish. The Arizona Supreme Court allowed 
recovery on the ground that the officer should have realized the prob-
able consequences of his conduct. Since Massachusetts recognizes, as 
a general rule, that one is presumed to have intended the natural result 
of his acts, 17 it seems likely that Massachusetts courts would agree 
with the reasoning in Savage v. Boies. However, considering the Su-
preme Judicial Court's requirement of consequential bodily injury, 
there is a question whether the term natural result would embrace 
bodily injury as well as severe mental distress. 
A very broad interpretation of the word intentionally might include 
wanton or reckless conduct by the defendant, as in Blakeley v. Shortal's 
Estate, 18 where Shortal committed suicide by cutting his throat in the 
plaintiff's kitchen. Although intent might be found in such an act, it 
would seem more appropriate to describe the act as utterly without 
regard for possible consequences. In George, the Court declined to 
decide whether an allegation of wanton or reckless conduct would 
constitute a cause of action. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
Spade decision, which the Court emphasized in George, contained dic-
tum excluding wanton or reckless acts. 19 
Massachusetts courts will also have to decide how to deal with acts 
directed toward one person that actually cause severe mental distress 
to another. The doctrine of transferred intent has apparently been 
applied strictly in only one case involving mental distress,2° but some 
15 In State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952), 
there was evidence that members of the association had threatened to attack Siliznoff 
physically and destroy his trucks. 
16 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 ( 1954). 
17 Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 169, 104 N.E. 717,718 (1914). 
18 236 Iowa 787,20 N .W.2d28 (1945). 
19 "Nor do we include cases of acts done with gross carelessness or recklessness, show-
ing utter indifference to such consequences, when they must have been in the actor's 
mind." 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897). 
20 Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W.Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924). Defendant, unaware of plain-
tiff's presence or pregnancy, attacked plaintiff's father. Plaintiff suffered severe mental 
distress and a subsequent miscarriage. This application of the doctrine of transferred 
intent seems a bit strained; the defendant was completely unaware of the daughter's 
presence, and no threat of any kind was directed at her. Prosser has described the deci-
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courts have allowed recovery on the theory that the defendant's acts 
were such as to make it substantially certain that the plaintiff would 
suffer severe mental distress.21 Prosser, however, takes a rather strict 
view: "However extreme and outrageous the conduct may have been 
toward the third person, in the absence of any direct intention to affect 
the plaintiff, some violation of a legal obligation to him must be found 
before there can be liability."22 The Restatement of Torts Second 
takes a slightly broader position than that taken by Prosser: "Where 
[the extreme and outrageous] conduct is directed at a third person, the 
actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress . . . to any other person who is present at the same 
time .... " 23 
The second limitation which the Supreme Judicial Court placed on 
recovery under the George rule is that the mental distress must be 
severe. The purpose of the requirement is elimination of claims for 
transitory mental distress resulting from petty insults and mere hurt 
feelings. However, beyond distinguishing between the extremes of 
transitory hurt feelings and genuine extreme mental distress, a quan-
titative definition of severe mental distress is difficult. Prosser would 
ask whether the mental distress alleged was what the "reasonable man" 
of "ordinary sensibilities" would undergo under ~he same circum-
stances.24 The Restatement provides a more complete guideline: 
The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that 
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity 
and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in de-
termining its severity. Severe distress must be proved; but in many 
cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's con-
duct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed.25 
Case law in other jurisdictions appears to follow the Restatement posi-
tion that "severe" will often be defined in terms of the outrageousness 
of the defendant's acts.26 
The third limitation which the Supreme Judicial Court placed on 
recovery under the George rule- is that the severe mental distress must 
produce consequential bodily injury. In other jurisdictions which re-
quire consequential bodily injury, the courts have generally taken a 
rather liberal view of what is a physical consequence of severe mental 
sian as "not too clear." Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40, 57 (1956). 
21 E.g., Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961). Defendant told plaintiff 
that he would kill her husband, and subsequently did so. 
22 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40, 56 ( 1956). 
23 Restatement of Torts Second §46. 
24 Prosser, The LawofTorts§l2, at59(4thed. 1971). 
25 Restatement of Torts Second §46, Comment j. 
26 See, e.g., Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). Defendant 
continually telephoned plaintiff; sent threatening letters; spoke to neighbors, co-workers, 
and plaintiff's employer; sent special delivery letters and telegrams late at night; and 
called plaintiff's relatives collect, demanding payment of plaintiff's debt. 
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distress.27 The heart attacks suffered by Mrs. George would certainly 
satisfy even a restrictive standard; the problem arises when headaches, 
loss of sleep, nervousness, crying spells, etc., are alleged as physical 
consequences. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has said: 
The term "physical" is not used in its ordinary sense for pur-
poses of applying the "physical consequences" rule. Rather, the 
word is used to indicate that the condition or illness for which re-
covery is sought must be one susceptible of objective determina-
tion. Hence, a definite nervous disorder is a "physical injury" 
sufficient to support an action for damages .... 28 [Emphasis 
added.] 
Such a standard seems desirable because its requirement of "objective 
determination" allows for advances in diagnostic medical technology 
and provides a rational basis for evaluating alleged injuries. 
Under the George rule, the plaintiff must show not only that the 
mental distress alleged was severe, and that the consequential injury 
alleged was physical, but also that there was a causal relationship (a) 
between the conduct of the defendant and the alleged severe mental dis-
tress, and (b) between the alleged severe mental distress and the alleged 
bodily injury.29 Although producing objective scientific proof of the 
existence and cause of severe mental distress is often difficult, 30 convinc-
ing a jury may not, as a practical matter, be quite so difficult. As Chief 
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court has pointed out, jury-
men can generally determine from their own experience what acts 
could reasonably be expected to cause severe mental distress in an 
ordinary person.31 Further, if it can be shown that "the defendant ac-
tually intended to cause the plaintiff severe mental distress, the causal 
relationship is easily established. A complication may be added if the 
27 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 70 App. D.C. 183, 105 F.2d 62 (1939) (aggra-
vation of existing arterial hypertension); Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 
S.W.2d 64 (1954) (severe headaches, nervous indigestion, loss of sleep and wright); Sutton 
Motor Co. v. Crysel, 289 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (headaches, dizziness, crying 
spells, backache); cf. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933) (court required 
"substantial" physical injury manifested by an "external condition" or symptoms 
"clearly indicative" of a "pathological, physiological or mental state"). 
28 Petition of United States, 418 F.2d 264, 269 (1st Cir. 1969). Although this case was 
an admiralty action alleging negligence on the part of the Coast Guard in towing a 
disabled vessel, the definition of "physical consequences" enunciated by the court could 
be applied to cases of intentional infliction of mental distress. 
29 The medical profession has historically taken a much stricter view of the meaning 
of the word cause than has the legal profession. For a thorough discussion of the differ-
ence between the viewpoints of the two professions and some suggestions for resolution 
of the conflict, see Averbach, Causation: A Medico-Legal Battlefield, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 
209 (1957); Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Con-
cept of Causation, 31 Texas L. Rev. 630 (1953). 
30 See Wasmuth, Medical Evaluation of Mental Pain and Suffering, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. 
Rev. 7 (1957). 
31 State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 
(1952). 
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plaintiff is, for some reason, extremely susceptible to psychic stimuli. In 
such a situation, most courts would probably agree that if the defendant 
intended to cause the plaintiff severe mental distress, he cannot defend 
on the ground that he could not have succeeded without the plaintiff's 
unknown extreme susceptibility.32 If the defendant did not actually 
intend to cause severe mental distress, the plaintiff should be required 
to prove that the defendant was aware of plaintiff's extreme susceptibility 
and acted with that knowledge. 33 
Proving the second link of causation, between the alleged mental 
distress and the alleged physical injury, can be especially difficult. 
There seems to be little doubt that severe mental distress can have cer-
tain physical consequences;34 but "[ d]espite impressions prevalent 
in some quarters, psychic stimuli such as fright do not usually produce 
physical injury or disability in an average person."35 The fact that 
severe mental distress may be only a "trigger" for a preexisting dis-
order does not preclude recovery, but may place a definite burden on the 
plaintiff: 
Plaintiff should be required to prove that physiological changes 
generated by emotional stimulus in the opinion of science can 
injuriously affect the particular organ of his body or aggravate his 
particular preexisting impairment as alleged. Furthermore, proof 
that the injury could result from the stimulus, is only one step in 
proving that it probably did do so. Affirmative corroboration of 
probable causation is important, and causation by adequate 
independent causes should be negatived.36 
Perhaps of greatest importance is the threshold question of whether 
a given emotional stimulus can cause the physical injury alleged; yet 
scientific support for a particular claim will vary. For example, there 
seems to be sufficient scientific evidence to support a claim that an 
attack of angina pectoris can be caused by severe mental distress,37 but 
some authorities have questioned whether abortion (miscarriage) can 
ever be caused by severe mental distress.38 
32 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 70 App. D.C. 183, 187, 105 F.2d 62, 66 
(1939). 
33 See, e.g., Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920); Prosser, The Law of 
Torts §12 (4th ed. 1971). 
34 See generally Hilton, Fright, Flight or Fight, 27 Advances in Sci. 144 (1970); Leh-
mann, The Emotional Basis of Illness, 28 Diseases Nerv. Sys. 12 (Supp. 1967); Smith, 
Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury Cases, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 586 (1963); Smith, Rela-
tion o{ Emotion to Injury and Disease, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193 (1944); Smith and Solomon, 
Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 39 Va. L. Rev. 87 (1943). 
35 Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Disease, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193, 302 (1944). 
See also Moritz, Pathology of Tra;uma 16-17 (1954). 
36 Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Disease, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193, 289(1944). 
37 Donald, The Effect of Mental and Physical Strain on the Cardiovascular System, 
62 Proc. Royal Socy. Med. 1180 (1969); Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Dis-
ease, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193, 289 (1944). Angina pectoris is a condition marked by brief 
paroxysmal attacks of chest pain. 
38 Note, 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 188 (1947); Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Dis-
ease, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193, 295-296 (1944). 
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Proof of causation between mental distress and physical injury will 
usually involve expert medical testimony, which can be very difficult 
for the laymen on a jury to evaluate. Perhaps as a result of the complex-
ity of the medical evidence, many cases seem to have been decided largely 
on the basis of probabilities.39 Three interesting suggestions have been 
offered to meet the problem of evaluating complex medical testimony. 
One suggestion would involve an expanded use of judicial notice: 
The antidote requires recognition that "conflict of expert testi-
mony" at trial is no guarantee that the evidence is scientifically 
sufficient to support a verdict. Under existing practice, the chief 
corrective is for courts to employ the doctrine of judicial notice 
freely in determining whether the evidence satisfies scientific cri-
teria of proof expounded on behalf of the medical profession by 
accredited writers.40 
Such an expansion of judicial notice should be weighed carefully, since 
it is unlikely that most judges would have any greater medical compe-
tence than would the jury. The court would be dealing with "facts which 
are 'verifiable' by the Court, but only by its investigation and assess-
ment of data beyond the personal competence of the Court to evaluate. "41 
Unless the court is supplied with expert and impartial assistance in 
evaluating data and relating it to the fact proposed for judicial notice, 
it seems that formal proof should be required.42 
Another suggestion for dealing with the problem of complex medical 
testimony is that "[ v ]erdicts should be directed against persons having 
the burden of proof in all cases where the evidence is insubstantial and 
speculative."43 This suggestion is based on the assumption that the 
judge is in a better position than is the jury to evaluate the proffered 
medical testimony, an assumption which is surely questionable. In 
Massachusetts, the judge must assure himself of the qualifications of 
all witnesses offered as medical experts.44 If the witnesses offered by 
both the plaintiff and the defendant qualify as experts, the question of 
39 See, e.g., Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69,222 A.2d 513 (1966) (no recovery for 
heart attack allegedly suffered as a result of seeing brown water flow from water softener); 
Darrin v. Capital Transit Co., 90 A.2d 823 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1952) (insufficient med-
ical evidence to link with nervous shock the plaintiff's inability to grasp tightly with 
either hand); Doherty v. Mississippi Power Co., 178 Miss. 204, 173 So. 287 (1937) (ex-
treme nervousness, physical pain, and near miscarriage not "natural and probable" re-
sult of disconnection of electric service for alleged nonpayment of bills); St. Louis, I.M. 
& S. Ry. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901) (nervous prostration not "natural and 
probable" result of being let off train 40 or 50 feet from lighted public crossing at night). 
The cases noted above were all cast as negligence actions by the courts. Apparently, in 
cases involving intentional infliction of mental distress, courts have not been so con-
cerned with positive proof that the alleged severe mental distress did cause the alleged 
bodily injury as they have been in cases involving negligent infliction of mental distress. · 
40 Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Disease, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193, 283-284 
(1944). 
41 Hughes, Evidence, 19Mass. PracticeSeries§71 (1961). 
42 Voorhis, Expert Opinion Evidence, 13 N.Y.L.F. 651 (1968). 
43 Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Disease, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193, 305 (1944). 
44 Hughes, Evidence, 19 Mass. Practice Series §325 ( 1961 ). 
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causation must go to the jury unless one of the expert witnesses fails 
to base his opinion on "facts proved or assumed, sufficient to enable 
the expert to form an intelligent opinion," or unless he fails to form 
any opinion at all, "however cautiously stated."45 
A third suggestion for dealing with complex medical testimony in-
volves the convening of an impartial panel of medical experts.46 These 
experts would examine the plaintiff and offer impartial testimony in 
regard to causation. The purpose of such a plan is to avoid the clashing 
of expert opinion, which can confuse a lay jury. The merits of such a 
plan have been hotly debated by members of both the medical and 
legal professions.47 Although the impartial expert witness approach 
has its attractions, it does create problems where a valid difference of 
opinion still exists within the medical community. 
The three suggestions noted above appear to be motivated by a fear 
that a lay jury grappling with complex medical evidence may base its 
decision more on the ability of counsel to arouse sympathy than on 
scientific criteria.48 Although the court is presumably less likely to be 
swayed by counsel than is the jury, the court has, at present, no greater 
medical expertise than the jury. Perhaps the solution to the problem 
of complex medical evidence is not to diminish the role of the jury, 
nor to eliminate the conflict of expert testimony, but to eliminate the 
absolute requirement of consequential bodily injury. The rationale 
advanced for the requirement of consequential bodily injury is that it 
is evidence of the existence and severity of the alleged mental distress.49 
This rationale is drawn somewhat into question when some of the 
physical consequences which have been accepted by the courts are 
examined. It would seem arguable that just as the impact requirement in 
actions for negligent infliction of mental distress was often circum-
vented by allowing the slightest impact to satisfy the requirement,50 
so has the consequential physical injury requirement, in some cases, 
been virtually nullified.51 
45 Id. §326. 
46 Berman, The Impartial Medical Witness Project, 14Md. Med.J. 29(1965). 
47 Myers, The Battle of The Experts: A New Approach to an Old Problem in Medical 
Testimony, 50 Neb. Med. ]. 301, 357, 427 (1965). 
48 See Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959). Plain-
tiff, 12 weeks pregnant, was injured in an automobile accident caused by defendant's 
negligence. Plaintiff subsequently gave birth to a Mongoloid child. The jury awarded 
$50,000 for the impairment_ of the child. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the 
evidence of causation was inadequate as a matter of law. The Court's opinion suggested 
that "[a] scientific theory is not legally validated simply because a physician is willing 
to base an opinion on it." In the Puhl case, however, neither the plaintiff's doctor nor 
the defendant's doctor was qualified as an expert in the area of causation of Mongolism. 
The case was discussed in Note, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 554, 598 (1962). 
49 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 70 App. D.C. 183, 105 F.2d 62 (1939); Duty 
v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954); Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 
254, 135 P.2d 330 (1943); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 
(1936). 
50 See, e.g., Homans v. Boston Elev. Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) (plain-
tiff received slight bump and bruises in collision). 
51 See n.27 supra. 
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The Restatement adopts the position that an absolute requirement of 
consequential physical injury is not necessary.52 Since the Supreme 
Judicial Court in George relied heavily on the Restatement, it is pos-
sible that in subsequent cases the Court will be inclined to adopt the 
entire Restatement position. Perhaps, as Prosser suggests, the most 
satisfactory rule is one which relates the necessity of showing conse-
quential physical injury to the outrageousness of the defendant's 
conduct: 
Probably the conclusion to be reached is that where physical harm 
is lacking the courts will properly tend to look for more in the 
way of extreme outrage as an assurance that the mental distur-
bance claimed is not fictitious; but that if the enormity of the out-
rage itself carries conviction that there has in fact been severe and 
serious mental distress, which is neither feigned nor trivial, bodily 
harm is not required.53 
The fourth limitation which the Supreme Judicial Court placed on 
recovery under the George rule is that the conduct of the defendant 
must be "extreme and outrageous." Prosser suggests that the conduct 
must go beyond all bounds of decency-that it must be "atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community."54 The Restatement 
guideline suggests that "[g]enerally, the case is one in which the recita-
tion of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse 
his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outra-
geous!' "55 The first cases recognizing a cause of action for intention-
al infliction of severe mental distress involved unquestionably repre-
hensible conduct.56 Cases in the specific area of debt collection, 
however, have shown a trend toward the use of a "reasonableness" 
standard, even though there is still reference to the standard of "ex-
treme and outrageous" conductY 
This emerging reasonableness standard seems to be comprised of 
three factors: (l) consideration of the debtor's susceptibility to emo-
tional distress resulting from the creditor's collection efforts (the credi-
tor must have actual or apparent power over the debtor); (2) considera-
tion of the legitimacy and collectibility of the debt; and (3) considera-
tion of the intent of the creditor.58 Although the reasonableness 
52 "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly 
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." Re-
statement of Torts Second §46. 
53 Prosser, The LawofTorts§l2 (4thed. 1971). 
54 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40,44 (195(i). 
55 Restatement of Torts Second §46, Comment d. 
56 See, e.g., Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W.25 (1932) 
(to collect debt of $21.75, defendant sent "coarse and vindictive" letters, threatened 
suit, threatened to have plaintiff fired from his job, and called him a "criminal"); Duty 
v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954), detailed in n.26 supra. 
57 Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Lamos,-Iowa-, 179 N.W.2d 573 (1970); Lyons v. Zale 
Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154 (1963); Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 
2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950). 
58 Note, 17 Hastings L.J. 369, 375-376 ( 1965 ). 
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standard is a stricter standard viz-a-viz the creditor than is the "extreme 
and outrageous" standard, no creditor would be denied the right to 
collect a valid debt by reasonable, legal means.59 In a recent Iowa 
case, the court announced that"[ i]f there is an undisputed amount owed 
and the debtor refuses to pay, tactics used to collect might well be more 
drastic than those permissible where no debt is owed or its existence is 
disputed."60 The Supreme Judicial Court may have been considering 
the foregoing line of reasoning when it referred in George to the pos-
sibility of the creditor having a certain privilege ("one who, without 
privilege to do so"). The reasonableness standard would create a 
qualified privilege61 protecting the creditor so long as he uses reason-
able, legal means to pursue a legitimate and collectible debt. 
The use of the words extreme and outrageous in the Restatement was 
intended to exclude recovery for the petty insults and upsets of our 
modern society.62 Arguably, individuals still need the freedom to blow 
off steam without fear of legalliability.63 It is suggested, however, that 
in the limited area of debtor-creditor relations, a reasonableness stan-
dard, as outlined above, would be more appropriate than the Restate-
ment position. In a society that places such great emphasis on credit 
and credit ratings, the debtor can be at a great disadvantage when 
dealing with an overreaching or unscrupulous creditor. The reason-
ableness standard would protect the debtor against unreasonable in-
trusions by creditors, and at the same time would protect the legitimate 
interests of creditors. 
The George decision invites several subsidiary questions, the first of 
which concerns the matter of notice to the defendant. Must the plaintiff 
always inform the defendant of the consequences which the defendant's 
conduct is allegedly producing, and must such notice include claims 
of physical injury as well as severe mental distress? In George, the 
Supreme Judicial Court emphasized the fact that Jordan Marsh con-
tinued its collection efforts in the face of notice by the plaintiff that she 
did not owe the debt and that she was suffering severe mental and phys-
ical anguish as a result of Jordan Marsh's conduct. Courts in other 
jurisdictions seem to agree that notice is required only when the de-
fendant did not actually intend to cause harm and could not be ex-
pected to know that his conduct would be likely to cause harm.64 The 
59 Reasonable, legal collection tactics will never incur liability. See Duty v. Gen-
eral Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954); Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 
254, 135 P.2d 330 (1943); Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 
25 (1932). 
60 Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Lamos,-Iowa-, 179 N.W.2d573, 584 (1970). 
61 For an extended discussion of the qualified privilege, see Hochman, "Out-
rageousness" and Privilege in the Law of Emotional Distress-A Suggestion, 47 
Cornell L.Q. 61 (1961). 
62 Restatement of Torts Second §46, Comment d. 
6g For an interesting discussion of possible formulas regulating liability for 
insulting language, see Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 
Vand. L. Rev. 63 (1950); Seitz, Insults-Practical Jokes-Threats of Future Harm-
How New as Torts? 28 Ky. L.J. 411 (1940). 
64 Reading together the cases of Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 
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Restatement has adopted a similar position.65 As to the content of the 
notice, it would seem that notice of consequential bodily injury should 
be required only in jurisdictions which require consequential bodily 
injury as a prerequisite to recovery. Perhaps the emphasis on notice 
in the George decision arises from the Supreme Judicial Court's feeling 
that the harassment alleged may not have been outrageous unless 
viewed in the context of the defendant's refusal to heed the plaintiff's 
notice that the debt was not owed and that the collection tactics were 
causing her severe mental and physical distress. 
It seems clear that a creditor need not cease reasonable collection 
efforts simply because he has received an unverified notice that his 
collection tactics are causing the debtor severe mental and physical 
suffering. If, upon the receipt of such notice, the creditor wer.e obliged 
to cease all collection efforts, he could be faced with financial hard-
ship, and the debtor would be able to delay payment of a valid debt. 
Arguably, in order to protect the creditor from such a burden, it should 
be realized that "[t]he debtor has voluntarily chosen to join the modern 
trend toward credit living and, in so doing, has impliedly assented 
to pressure from those who have a legitimate interest in the timely 
payment of his debts."66 The Restatement is in accord with this view: 
"The actor is never liable, for example, where he has done no more 
than to insist on his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he 
is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional dis-
tress."67 (Emphasis added.) A different situation may arise, however, 
if the creditor receives substantial verification that his collection efforts 
have caused actual physical distress. 
A different question may also be posed where there is the possibility 
that the debtor may not be liable for the debt. In its brief for the Su-
preme Judicial Court, Jordan Marsh argued: 
[At Jordan Marsh Company,] collection procedures are handled 
by individual employees who have no knowledge of the particular 
customer, no way of knowing the particular facts and circum-
stances concerning the purchases charged to the customer's ac-
S.W.2d 64 (1954), and Whatley v. K-Mart Discount Stores, 451 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1970), it would appear that Texas requires notice only when the defendant 
could not reasonably expect his conduct to cause severe mental distress. Similarly, 
in the District of Columbia (Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 70 App. D.C. 183, 105 
F.2d 62 (1939), Mississippi (Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154 
(1963) ), Arizona (Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954) ), North Caro-
lina (Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936) ), and 
Georgia (Delta Fin. Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956) ), notice 
is not required if the defendant intended to cause mental distress, or if he should 
have realized that his conduct could reasonably be expected to cause severe men-
tal distress. 
65 Restatement of Torts Second §46, Comment f. 
66 Note, 17 Hastings L.J. 369, 371 (1965), citing Gou1dman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. 
v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 684, 100 S.E.2d 881, 883 (1957), and Fraser v. Morrison, 39 
Hawaii 370, 375 (1952). 
67 Restatement of Torts Second §46, Comment g. 
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count, and no direct financial interest in whether or not a given 
overdue account is collected. These merely carry out a routine 
procedure from the time an account becomes overdue until such 
time as the account is paid, charged off as worthless, or referred to 
an attorney for redress through the courts.68 
The argument reflects the apparent inability of Jordan Marsh's 
credit machinery, like that of many other businesses, to respond to 
notice that a debt is not owed. Use of credit is increasing rapidly in 
our society. In view (')f the fact that almost all major credit problems 
are reported to central files available to all member creditors, and in 
view of the fact that loss of credit at a store such as Jordan Marsh 
may mean impairment or loss of all credit, it would not seem un-
reasonable to require the creditor to investigate allegations of non-
liability for debts. Although debtors could take advantage of such a 
requirement, perhaps the burden on creditors should be weighed 
against the harassment and impairment of credit that a person may 
be subjected to because of clerical or mechanical error. 
Creditors who retain collection agencies to collect debts for them 
should ascertain what methods the agencies use in pursuing the debt, 
since the creditor could be held liable for the extreme and outrageous 
conduct of its collector on an agency theory.69 Where a collection agen-
cy is employed by the creditor, notice to the agency would, under 
agency principles, be notice to the creditor. 
A second subsidiary question raised by the George decision is whether 
the new cause of action will survive the death of the plaintiff, assum-
ing that the death is not itself traceable to the defendant. The answer to 
the question depends on the interpretation given to the survival statute: 
"In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the 
following shall survive: ... (2) actions of tort (a) for assault, battery, 
imprisonment or other damage to the person .... " 70 Massachusetts 
courts have in the past interpreted the phrase "damage to the person" 
to mean actual bodily injury, rather than emotional distress,71 and 
the Massachusetts survival statute has apparently been uniformly 
interpreted to preclude survival of actions where the injury alleged 
was to the plaintiff's feelings.72 In Cohen v. Lion Products Co.,73 
which is the only case to date dealing with the effect of the Massachu-
setts survival statute on the tort of intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress, the federal District Court for Massachusetts concluded that the 
68 Brief for Defendant at 13-14, George v.] ordan Marsh Co. 
69 It is not within the scope of this casenote to discuss the liability of a creditor 
who sells his uncollected bills to a collection agency. 
70 G.L., c. 228, §l. 
71 Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 138 N.E. 808 (l923); Wilkins v. Wainwright, 
173 Mass. 212, 53 N.E. 397 (1899). 
72 Cummings v. Bird, ll5 Mass. 346 (1874) (action for libel does not survive); 
Nettleton v. Dinehart, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 543 (1850) (action for malicious prosecu-
tion does not survive). 
73 177 F. Supp. 486(D. Mass.l959). Seen.lOsupra. 
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cause of action would not survive the death of the plaintiff.74 
The rule adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court in George v. jordan 
Marsh Co. is narrow and carefully worded, leaving the Court with 
flexibility in deciding future cases on the merits. There is room in the 
rule for expansion, even to the point of dropping the requirement of 
consequential bodily injury in cases of particularly reprehensible 
conduct by a defendant. On the other hand, the Court has charted a 
difficult path for plaintiffs claiming under the George rule and has 
set up formidable barriers against fraudulent claims. Massachusetts 
was relatively late in recognizing a cause of action for intentional in-
fliction of severe mental distress with consequential physical injury; 
the courts of the Commonwealth are in a position, therefore, to bene-
fit from the experience of other jurisdictions. 
WILLIAM H. LYONS 
74 ld. at 490. Although Judge Wyzanski's conclusion is not binding on Massachu-
setts state. courts, his reasoning seems persuasive. Perhaps only legislative action to 
amend G.L., c. 228, §I will allow survival of the cause of action. For a general discus-
sion of the concept of survival of causes of action, see Note, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1008 
(1935). 
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